The Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association by South Carolina Historical Association
o.C. 
I f:J . 7 
outh 
1966 
Copy 3 
THE PROCEEDINGS 
of 
The South Carolina 
Historical Association 
1966 
CONTENTS 
The Thirty-Sixth Annual Meeting ------------------------------------- 2 
The Abortive Negotiations for a Free-Trade Coalition 
to Defeat Tariff Reform: October, 1903, to February, 
1904 ---------------------------------------------------------~------------------- 5 
RICHARD A. REMPEL 
The End of the American Watch on the Rhine________________________ 18 
.ALExANDER R. STOESEN 
Jim Crow Comes to South Carolina -------------------~--------------- 27 
ALBERT N. SANDERS 
Andrew Johnson: The Second Swing 'Round the Circle________ 40 
RoBERT J. MooRE 
The Mature Religious Thought of John Adams ______________________ 49 
ROBERT B. EVERE'IT 
Constitution ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 58 
OFFICERS OF THE ASSOCIATION, 1966-67 
President ___________________________________________________ LEONAIID H. FORTUNATO, The Citadel 
Vice-President ___________________ ..BRADLEY D. BARGAR, University of South Carolina 
Secretary-Treasurer ______________________________ RoBERT C. TuCKER, Furman University 
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 
( In addition to the officers named above) 
LoWRY P. WARE, Erskine College 
HENRY VON HASSELN, Anderson College 
WINSTON C. BABB, Furman University 
Editor of Proceedings 
JACK S. MULLINS, South Carolina Archives Department 
The South Carolina Historical Association supplies the Proceedings to all its members. 
The Executive Committee elects the Editor. Beginning in 1935, every fifth number 
contains an index for the preceding five years. The price of the Proceedings to persons 
not members of the Association is $2.00 per copy. Orders should be sent to the Secre-
tary-Treasurer, whose address is Furman University Library, Greenville, South Carolina. 
THE PROCEEDINGS 
of 
The South Carolina 
Historical Association 
1966 
JACK S. MULLINS 
Editor 
COLUMBIA 
THE SOUTH CAROLINA 
HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION 
1966 
fs~C. STATE LIBRARY 
THE THIRTY-SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING 
The thirty-sixth annual meeting of the South Carolina Historical Associ-
ation was held Saturday, April 2, 1966, at Wofford College, Spartanburg, 
South Carolina. About 122 members and guests attended one or more of 
the programs. 
Following registration and a coffee hour in front of Shipp Hall, the mem-
bers attended one of two sessions that met at 10 A.M. In DuPre Hall 
Lounge, there was a session for high school teachers, at which Albert N. 
Sanders, Furman University, read a paper entitled "Jim Crow Comes to 
South Carolina." This was followed by a discussion on enrichment programs 
for the teaching of history in South Carolina schools, led by W. Eugene 
Smith, Social Studies Supervisor, State Department of Education of South 
Carolina, who was assisted by Mrs. Elaine W. Marks, Spartanburg High 
School, and Mrs. Eliza H. Stone, Dreher High School, Columbia. The other 
session was held in Shipp Hall Lounge, at which the program consisted of 
a paper by Richard A. Rempel, University of South Carolina, "The Abortive 
Negotiations for a Free Trade Coalition to Defeat Tariff Reform: September, 
1903, to February, 1904," and one by Alexander R. Stoesen, Newberry Col-
lege, "America Leaves the Rhineland Occupation, 1923." 
Luncheon was served in Wightman Hall. It was followed by a business 
session at which President Marsh of Wofford College brought greetings to 
the Association. The Treasurer's report was distributed to the members 
present. Dr. Lowry P. Ware of Erskine College proposed that the Consti-
tution be amended to increase the number of members at large on the 
Executive Committee from two to three. His motion was seconded, and it 
was passed unanimously. Hereafter, Section V of the Constitution shall 
read: "There shall be an executive committee made up of the officers and 
of three other members . . . ." 
The Executive Committee nominated this slate of officers for 1966-1967: 
President: Leonard H. Fortunato, The Citadel 
Vice-President: Bradley D. Bargar, University of South Carolina 
Secretary-Treasurer: Robert C. Tucker, Furman University 
Executive Committee member: Henry von Hasseln, Anderson College 
( term to expire 1969) 
Executive Committee member: Winston C. Babb, Furman University 
( to complete the term of Bradley D. Bargar) 
There were no nominations from the floor and the slate of officers was elected 
unanimously. President Jones then announced that Dr. Jack S. Mullins, 
South Carolina Archives Department, has been elected Editor of the Pr~ 
ceedings by the Executive Committee. 
Because the session for high school teachers of history and social studies 
had been so well attended, it was recommended that there be two morning 
sessions at the 1967 meeting. 
The President announced that Dr. E. M. Lander, Jr., would continue as 
Chairman of the Membership Committee. 
Dr. Bargar offered a resolution, which was adopted, expressing apprecia-
tion to President Marsh and Dr. Lewis P. Jones and their associates at 
Wofford College for their excellent hospitality in providing facilities for 
the meeting. 
The afternoon session was held in Shipp Hall Lounge, beginning at 2:30. 
Dr. Jones announced the Executive Committee's acceptance of invitations 
to meet with the History Department of the University of South Carolina 
in 1967 and with Erskine College in 1968. Dr. Daniel W. Hollis proposed 
that a proper resolution be included in the 1966 Proceedings paying tribute 
to the late Francis Butler Simkins. The motion passed and the President 
appointed Drs. Hollis and George C. Rogers of the University of South 
Carolina and Dr. Robert S. Lambert of Clemson University to prepare the 
resolution. 
The afternoon program consisted of a paper by Robert J. Moore, Columbia 
College, "Andrew Johnson: The Second Swing 'Round the Circle," and one 
by Robert B. Everett, Winthrop College, "The Mature Religious Thought 
of John Adams." 
Beginning at 5 P.M., Dean and Mrs. Covington entertained the Associa-
tion at a reception at their home on the Wofford campus. 
The banquet session was held in Wightman Hall, beginning at 7:00 P.M. 
Dr. Hans W. Gatzke, Yale University, read a paper on "The Historian as 
the Nation's Conscience-German Historiography after Two World Wars," 
after which the meeting was adjourned. 
0 0 0 0 
The Executive Committee on April 25, 1966, nominated Dr. Daniel W. 
Hollis of the University of South Carolina to be the Association's repre-
sentative on the Governor's Tri-Centennial Commission. 
FRANCIS BUTLER SIMKINS 
1897-1966 
The death of Francis Butler Simkins of Farmville, Va., on February 9, 
1966, terminated the distinguished career of the historian who succeeded 
the late D. D. Wallace as the "dean of South Carolina history." 
Born on December 14, 1897, at Edgefield, Francis Simkins was gradu-
ated from the University of South Carolina in 1918. He then pursued gradu-
ate study at Columbia University, from which he received the M.A. degree 
in 1920 and the Ph.D. in 1926. His dissertation, The Tillman Movement in 
South Carolina, was a pioneer study of the Southern agrarian revolt. 
Dr. Simkins taught briefly at Randolph-Macon College (Lynchburg), 
The University of North Carolina, and Emory University before joining the 
faculty of Virginia State Teachers College ( later Longwood) in 1928. Al-
though he subsequently taught at Louisiana State University and was visit-
ing professor at Princeton in 1954-1955, he continued his association with 
Longwood College until the time of his death. 
His scholarly productivity was so voluminous that only the most dis-
tinguished of his works can be mentioned here. He had already produced 
several notable articles before the appearance in 1932 of Reconstruction in 
South Carolina ( with Robert H. Woody). The first significant revisionist 
study of Reconstruction ill South Carolina, this work was awarded the 
Dunning Prize by the American Historical Association and is still regarded as 
the best Reconstruction monograph for any Southern state. Pitchfork Ben 
Tillman, South Carolinian, an expansion of his dissertation, was published 
in 1944. This definitive biography is the most distinguished work in the field 
of recent South Carolina history. A History of the South (1953), a larger 
version of his earlier The South Oul and New, was referred to by reviewers 
as the most satisfactory one-volume work on the subject. Other publications 
included The Women of the Confederacy (with James W. Patton), a public 
school text on Virginia history (with Mrs. Virginia Spottswood Jones), The 
Everlasting South, and numerous essays, reviews and addresses. 
Dr. Simkins was awarded fellowships by the Social Science Research 
Council and the Guggenheim Memorial Foundation. In 1954 he served as 
president of the Southern Historical Association, and in 1956 he delivered 
the Walter L. Fleming Lectures at Louisiana State University. 
As a young historian Francis Simkins was a penetrating critic of his 
native state and region, but in later years he became an eloquent defender 
of Southern institutions. Regardless of his point of view, it was the product 
of painstaking research and intellectual integrity. The possessor of a 
sprightly prose style and the dispenser of stimulating comment, he contri-
buted greatly to the understanding of the history of South Carolina. 
THE ABORTIVE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A FREE-TRADE 
COALITION TO DEFEAT TARIFF REFORM: 
OCTOBER, 1903, TO FEBRUARY, 1904 
RICHARD A. REMPEL 
At Birmingham in May, 1903, Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain 
called for a drastic revision in fiscal policy in an appeal to the country over 
the head of Prime Minister Arthur Balfour and his cabinet colleagues. In 
October, 1903, Chamberlain launched his campaign for domestic protection 
to assist industry and to secure revenue for social reform and preferential 
tariffs in favor of the colonies in order to promote imperial consolidation. 
Tariff reform immediately became the most contentious British political issue 
in the period between the Irish Home Rule crisis of 1885-1886 and the an-
nouncement of the Lloyd George Budget of 1909. In traditionally free-trade 
England, the Colonial Secretary's platform challenged a whole range of 
deeply held beliefs. 
Ever since 1846 Great Britain had been largely a free importing country. 
The establishment of free trade had coincided with her greatest economic ex-
pansion, and many Englishmen believed that continued prosperity was bound 
up with the maintenance of free trade. Often elevated to the status of a dog-
ma, free trade was endowed with the qualities of promoting peaceful interna-
tional relations and harmony among classes within the state. Protection, by 
contrast, implied to many Victorians and Edwardians the denial of laissez-
faire, trade wars instead of cooperation, powerful and corrupt tariff lobbies 
in Parliament, and dear food for the masses. Consequently, the battle be-
tween the tariff reformers and free traders aroused deep passions. The con-
troversy split the Unionist party, helped to reunite the Liberals, and very 
nearly brought about a free-trade alliance between the Unionist opponents 
of Tariff Reform and the Liberals. 
The two most powerful political groups who opposed Chamberlain were 
a significant minority within his own party, the Unionist Free Traders, and 
the Liberal party. The Unionist Free Traders can be divided into three 
groups: First, the Whig Liberal Unionists who had broken with Gladstone 
over Home Rule-the Duke of Devonshire, Lord James of Hereford, Lord 
Goschen, St. Loe Strachey, and Arthur Elliot. These men, together with 
Chamberlain, had formed the Unionist alliance with the Conservatives after 
1886. Secondly, a number of old-guard Tories such as Sir Michael Hicks 
Beach and Lord George Hamilton opposed his program. They not only be-
lieved in free trade, but they also disliked Chamberlain and viewed him as 
a dangerous demagogue. A third body of opposition came from a faction 
containing ~ome of the most promising and independent young men in the 
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party, among whom were Winston Churchill and Lord Hugh Cecil-the 
most brilliant son of the former Prime Minister, the Marquis of Salisbury. 
For the Liberals, Chamberlain's campaign healed many of the savage 
internal quarrels which had plagued them from 1895 to 1903. On the eve 
of the free-trade struggle, the Liberals were just beginning to recover from 
some of their divisions and intense policy reappraisals of the South African 
War period. What the controversy did was to present a target at which both 
Radicals and Liberal Imperialists could aim in unison. The challenge re-
vitalized their traditional principles and consolidated the position of the 
moderate Radical, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, as leader. Willing to 
work with all who would aid them in the struggle to save free trade, the 
Liberal leaders ( particularly the imperialist wing dominated by Lord Rose-
bery, Herbert Asquith, and Richard Haldane) were prepared to make sacri-
fices to obtain the effective help of the Unionist Free Traders and to exploit 
the divisions in the government. The Liberals knew that if the Unionist 
Free Traders became convinced that Chamberlain was successfully con-
verting their party to protection, then many of them would be prepared to 
vote with the Liberals to destroy the administration. Especially after Oc-
tober, 1903, the Liberal leaders became so alarmed at what they thought to 
be Chamberlain's progress that they actively sought a concordat with the 
Unionist Free Traders. 
In the period from Chamberlain's first demands for fiscal change until 
he left the government in September, 1903, as a missionary for tariff reform, 
the skill of the Prime Minister prevented the threat of a free-trade coalition 
arising against him. By June 9 he had managed to get both Chamberlain 
and the free traders in the administration to agree to a cabinet concordat.1 
The intransigent free-trade ministers who agreed were Charles Ritchie, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lord George Hamilton, the Secretary of State 
for India, Lord Balfour of Burleigh, the Secretary of State for Scotland, and 
the Duke of Devonshire, Lord President of the Council. 
The Duke was by far the most important Unionist Free Trader. By virtue 
of his place in society, his great wealth, and his reputation for integrity and 
political wisdom, he was immensely esteemed by the landed classes. Balfour 
grasped the Duke's importance and, according to a recent historian, treated 
him "with a deference he showed to no other living creature."2 If he could 
induce the Duke to stand by the ministry he would be able to contain the 
threat from the free traders in the party. The terms of the concordat were 
that the fiscal question would remain an open question in the cabinet and 
1 Bernard Holland, The Life of Spencer Compton: Eighth Duke of Devonshire, Lon-
don, 1911, II, 307-309. 
2 Alfred Gollin, Balfour's Burden: Arthur Balfour and Imperial Preference, London, 
1966, p . 66. 
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that no minister would speal< publicly on the issue until after an inquiry 
into the fiscal question had been conducted by the Board of Trade. No 
fiscal policy would be decided until this delaying maneuver was completed. 
While the uneasy concordat muzzled the free traders within the adminis-
tration, those outside the ministry took the first steps to counter what they 
were certain would be a massive crusade by the Colonial Secretary. The 
young firebrand Winston Churchill had no illusions about Chamberlain's 
ruthlessness. He wrote to St. Loe Strachey, the editor of the Spectator, that 
"some of us have quite taken our political future into our hands" and con-
tinued: "But my purpose in writing is to let you know-at present in strict 
confidence-that it is proposed to form a League ... to counter Chamber-
lain's impending campaign .... Without organization we are bound first 
to be silenced and secondly to be destroyed."3 
A few days later Churchill reported that the League, which was to be-
come the Free Food League on July 13, was underway, and urged Strachey 
to write an editorial appealing to Hicks Beach to come forward. Strachey 
needed no prodding and came out with a powerful article on June 6 calling 
on Hicks Beach to step in and organize the Unionist Free Traders.4 Sir 
Michael Hicks Beach was an extremely influential old Tory who had only 
retired as Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1902. Until his departure he had 
been the foremost opponent of Chamberlain's imperial schemes in the Union-
ist cabinets from 1895. He was so incensed at Chamberlain's latest bid for 
power that he thrust himself back into the active political world and con-
tacted the aging Radical, Sir William Harcourt. Harcourt reported to Camp-
bell-Bannerman that he had "just had a long and important conversation 
with Hicks Beach. He is full of fight and determined to take the leading 
part in the opposition to the Chamberlain policy."5 A few weeks later he 
wrote his leader, again stressing the need to work with the Unionist Free 
Traders: "We cannot afford to dispense with their support any more than 
Wellington could afford to neglect the Prussians at Waterloo."6 
During the summer, however, these contracts were only exploratory. 
Most Unionist Free Traders had no desire to break with their party unless 
absolutely necessary. They desperately hoped that Balfour, from within the 
ministry, would check Chamberlain's ambitions. They were prepared, there-
fore, to observe the truce until the last cabinet meeting of the parliamentary 
session on September 14, when the future fiscal policy of the administration 
3 Churchill to Strachey, May 31, 1903, Strachey Papers, Spectator Offices, London. 
4 Spectator, June 6, 1903. 
5 Harcourt to Campbell-Bannerman, May 29, 1903, "Secret," Campbell-Bannerman 
Papers, Additional MSS, 41220, folio 108, British Museum. 
6 Harcourt to Campbell-Bannerman, July 6, 1903, Campbell-Bannerman Papers, 
Additional MSS, 41220, folio 133. 
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would be decided. The cabinet agreement could not go on beyond Sep-
tember, for Tariff Reformers and Free Traders alike were clamoring for a 
clear policy decision from the Prime Minister. As early as July, Balfour 
indicated the precarious nature of the truce when he wrote to Lord Selborne, 
the First Lord of the Admiralty: "As you know, I have exhausted every de-
vice in my power to prevent a party split .... As a matter of fact the diffi-
culty is to prevent Chamberlain preaching the new doctrine now in its most 
aggressive form ... . "1 
Balfour was concerned primarily with maintaining party unity and not 
with free trade or protection. He profoundly believed that the Unionist 
alliance was the only guardian of national interests, and he was thus pre-
pared to compromise on fiscal matters in order to remain in power. Indeed, 
just before the cabinet meeting he experienced a stroke of good fortune: un-
known to anyone, Chamberlain had written to him on September 9 offering 
to resign in order to speak freely in the country for Tariff Reform.8 Appar-
ently, two considerations motivated this extraordinary step. Because he had 
already been instrumental in splitting the Liberals in 1886, Chamberlain 
could not lay himself open to the charge of also breaking the Unionists; 
thus, he felt bound to accept Balfour's lead. Moreover, he knew that a mas-
sive propaganda campaign would be required before the country would 
accept his program, and he knew he would have greater scope to pursue his 
crusade outside the ministry. 
The two men conferred for an hour before the cabinet meeting of Sep-
tember 14. They resolved to force the resignations of all the free-trade minis-
ters except Devonshire.9 They also agreed that the Colonial Secretary should 
leave the ministry to go out as a missionary for Tariff Reform. The Prime 
Minister meanwhile would commit his government only to moderate fiscal 
change while waiting on the results of the campaign. 
At the cabinet meeting the Prime Minister at once made it clear to Ritchie 
and Balfour of Burleigh that they could not remain in the government be-
cause of their rigid Cobdenite opinions. As Devonshire put it, "I never 
heard anything more summary or decisive than the dismissal of the two 
Ministers."10 Hamilton felt obliged to leave his post with his free-trade col-
leagues; however, by informing the Duke of what he had withheld from the 
other ministers, namely that Chamberlain was also going to resign and that 
7 Balfour to Selborne, June 26, 1903, Balfour Papers, Additional MSS, 49708, folio 
126, British Museum. 
s Gollin, p. 118. 
9 Sandars to Balfour, December 26, 1903, Balfour Papers, Additional MSS, 49761, 
folio 24. Sandars commented that "he [Chamberlain] appears to have questioned whether, 
as things have turned out, he was wise in counselling you to try to keep the Duke when 
the others went .... " 
10 Holland, II, 340. 
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preference would not become government policy at present, Balfour pre-
vailed upon Devonshire to stay.11 All four resignations were then announced 
to an astonished public on September 18. 
In the light of these confusing events, the public and the politicians an-
xiously awaited the Prime Minister's policy declaration at Sheffield at the 
annual meeting of the National Union of Conservative Associations. At 
Sheffield on October 1, Balfour outlined his own fiscal policy, which he label-
ed retaliation. He asked the party to support him in urging the people to 
give future governments the power of imposing tariffs to be used in bar-
gaining to lower foreign customs duties.12 Many Unionist Free Traders, of 
whom the most important was Hicks Beach, 13 were won over by this speech, 
since the Prime Minister deliberately declined at present to commit the 
party to preference and to a general tariff. However, the Duke, much to the 
chagrin of Balfour, took the speech as an excuse to resign. Free traders were 
immensely relieved by his departure. Hamilton expressed this view when 
he wrote to the Duke: "I read with great satisfaction your letter to Balfour. 
I have warned Balfour's advisers that a policy of drift ... must ultimately 
leave him without a party. Chamberlain will lead the Protectionists, you 
the Free Traders . . . . The only hopei for the future is your leadership of 
the Free Trade section."14 
On October 6, Chamberlain opened his campaign at Glasgow. This was 
the beginning of the greatest one-man crusade since Gladstone's 1879 Mid-
lothian tour execrating the Bulgarian atrocities. If Chamberlain's advocacy 
lacked the moral emphasis of Gladstone's, it was equally fervent as he at-
tempted to elevate his appeal above his opponent's accusation of squalid 
protectionism into a plea, couched in both apocalyptic and messianic terms, 
to the nation. His sequence of speeches took him through all the major 
English industrial and commercial centers by January 19, 1904. 
The crucial point about this campaign is that informed opinion in 
England did not know whether Tariff Reform was winning or not. For every 
indication that the crusade was not succeeding, other developments gave 
credence to his claims that it was. Not until the by-election losses of January 
and February, 1904, was it apparent that Chamberlain's bid had failed. 
In response to this challenge sixty-five Unionist Free Trader M.P.'s met 
on October 23 to elect Devonshire president of the Free Food League.16 
11 "Memorandum of Events on Resigning," October 6, 1903, Devonshire Papers, 
item 340.2992A, Chatsworth, Devonshire. 
12 The Times (London), October 2, 1903. 
13 Hicks Beach to Balfour, October 11, 1903, Hicks Beach Papers, PCC/12, William-
strip Park, Gloucestershire. 
14 Hamilton to Devonshire, October 6, 1903, item 340.2993, Devonshire Papers. 
16 List of Free Food League Members of Parliamem, "early December 1903," Elliot 
Papers, Philipstoun House, Linlithgow, West Lothian. 
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In an atmosphere of increasing tension and excitement on November 25, 
1903, they held their first public rally at the Queen's Hall in London. This 
gathering saw nine ex-cabinet ministers on the platform and forcefully 
underlined the strength of the Unionist opposition to Chamberlain. The 
Annual Register described the gathering as one of ''historic significance." 
Sir Ryland Adkins, agent of the prominent Liberal, Lord Spencer, wrote 
ecstatically to his mentor about the Duke's speech and assured him that the 
Unionist Free Traders really meant business.17 
The Unionist Free Traders proposed to adopt a more aggressive policy 
against Chamberlain than merely the making of speeches. On December 10 
they decided to issue a public letter under Devonshire's name, advising 
Unionists not to vote for Tariff Reformers at the crucial by-elections sched-
uled for December 15 at Lewisham and Dulwich.18 This action under-
lined how much deeper Unionist divisions were than former Liberal troubles. 
At the height of their dissensions neither the Campbell-Bannerman group 
nor the Liberal Imperialists advocated withholding votes from the other or 
voting for the Unionists. The Tariff Reform press was understandably en-
raged. The Daily Telegraph fulminated that "with characteristic bluntness, 
Devonshire, in league with John Bums, Lloyd George, and Dr. Clifford has 
... declared war to the knife with all Tariff Reformers."19 
The letter made the by-elections, already the cynosure of all eyes, the 
first important test case between Tariff Reformers and Free Traders since 
the start of Chamberlain's campaign. Basing their predictions on the Duke's 
Lewisham letter, earlier by-election victories of 1902 and 1903, and the un-
inspiring character of the Tariff-Reform candidates, the Liberals expected 
to win one and perhaps both of the contests.20 The results, however, were 
two resounding Chamberlainite victories. The Secretary of the Liberal 
League, William Allard, was despondent, and, as he told Rosebery, "allowing 
that expectation was pitched too high ... , there is the melancholy fact that 
we were badly beaten despite certain advantages. I am forced to the con-
clusion that Dulwich and Lewisham have spoken for many London con-
stituencies."21 Writing in 1906 on the significance of these contests the de-
feated candidate in Lewisham, the famous Radical C. F. G. Masterman 
reflected: "Of all the mistakes ever made by any party rendered blind by 
16 Annual Register, 1903, p . 228. 
17 Sir Ryland Adkins to Spencer, December 12, 1903, Spencer Papers, Althorp, North-
hamptonshire. 
1s Unpublished "Political Journal" of the Hon. Arthur Elliot, December 10, 1903, I, 
64-65, Elliot Papers. 
19 London Daily Telegraph, December 12, 1903. 
20 Westminster Gazette, December 16, 1903. 
21 Allard to Rosebery, December 18, 1903, Rosebery Papers, Liberal League Corre-
spondence, box 106. 
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prosperity and ignorance time may brand as the greatest the refusal of Mr. 
Balfour to dissolve Parliament after the Dulwich and Lewisham elections. 
The Chief Chip had advised it; Mr. Chamberlain desired it. Fiscal Reform 
was in the flow of an exultant tide."22 The Daily Telegraph asserted that the 
results "wiped out the Unionist Free Traders as a factor in Contemporary 
politics."23 This was a premature judgment, for the losses spurred the Union-
ist Free Traders on to renewed efforts and accelerated their cautious moves 
towards an alliance with the Liberals. 
Considerable difficulties lay in the way of an alliance. Unionist Free 
Traders agreed with most Libera~ only in stanch espousal of free trade. 
Moreover, Conservative free traders were traditionally hostile to Liberalism 
and were bound by deep ties of loyalty to Balfour. This was particularly 
the case with Hicks Beach and Hugh Cecil-two of the most powerful 
Unionist Free Traders. Moreover, the radical wing of the Liberal party was 
deeply suspicious of associating with the Whigs and the dyed-in-the-wool 
Tories who largely made up the Unionist Free Traders. Finally, one piece 
of Unionist legislation, the Education Act of 1902, impeded negotiations for 
an alliance. This act had abolished the School Boards, many of which had 
been dominated by Nonconformists, and thus had enraged organized dis-
sent which was largely Liberal in sympathy. The Liberal party was pledged 
to bring in a new education settlement. Even as confirmed a Home Ruler 
as Spencer was quite ready to shelve home rule for the time being in the 
interests of the Unionist Free Traders, but he was not willing to retreat on 
the education question: "To clear Home Rule for complete union with Rose-
bery, Devonshire and Goschen is no doubt necessary and Asquith believes 
it can be done . . . but then there are other questions on which we cannot 
agree. Education."24 
Despite these difficulties, steps had to be taken to coordinate free-trade 
efforts. Chamberlain's campaign was scheduled to conclude with the open-
ing of the 1904 parliamentary session, at which time he might be powerful 
enough to force an election and commit the Unionist party to his whole pro-
gram-not merely to retaliation. The Liberals planned to have the govern-
ment clarify its fiscal position by moving an amendment to the Speech from 
the Throne censuring Tariff Reform. If the Unionist Free Traders stood by 
their convictions and voted for the amendment, they would expose them-
selves further to the hostility of the party machine and to intensified efforts 
by Tariff Reformers to purge them from their constituencies. 
22 Quoted in the London National Review, January, 1906. 
23 London Daily Telegraph, December 17, 1903. 
24 Spencer to Campbell-Bannerman, December 7, 1903, Campbell-Bannerman Papers, 
Additional MSS, 41225, folio 220. 
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As early as December 2, the High Tory, Hugh Cecil, had urged the Duke 
to open negotiations with the Liberals, asserting that unless their opposition 
to Chamberlain were backed by an agreement with the Liberals each Union-
ist Free Trader would be destroyed separately by the Tariff Reform ma-
chine. 25 Devonshire concurred and wrote on December 12 to Rosebery 
asking what the Liberals would be prepared to do about safeguarding the 
seats of the Unionist Free Trade M.P.'s if the latter voted against their 
government.26 Rosebery conveyed the Duke's question to Asquith, through 
whom it was relayed to Campbell-Bannerman.27 
This did not carry matters very far, and the Liberal Chief Whip, Herbert 
Gladstone, feared that the possibility of an imminent dissolution would catch 
Free Traders unprepared. On December 21 he pleaded with Campbell-
Bannerman for a definite policy toward the Unionist Free Traders: "Time is 
slipping away and excepting certain action which I can take here and there, 
nothing is being done for the serious and practical considerations of our 
relations with the Conservative Free Traders."28 On the same day as Glad-
stone's letter, Lord James of Hereford, an emissary of the Duke, met with 
Asquith to discuss the prospects of an alliance. James drew up a memoran-
dum of their conversation, which was circulated to a number of Liberal 
leaders.29 
In response to these overtures, the Liberals decided to hold a meeting of 
ex-cabinet ministers on January 5 to decide upon a general policy towards 
the Unionist Free Traders. Spencer said that he could not act as a go-be-
tween with Devonshire until a consensus was reached.30 Just before the 
Liberal meeting, Devonshire took the initiative and wrote to Spencer in-
quiring how far the Liberals would be prepared to cooperate if the Unionist 
Free Traders voted against the administration.81 The way had been cleared 
for this correspondence by many hints from Free Traders, such as the journ-
alist Harold Cox, that the Duke was anxious to communicate with Spencer. 
Cox informed Spencer that he knew through one of Devonshire's lieutenants 
that "the Duke is gravely alarmed at Chamberlain's success and thinks the 
time had come to consider whether some fusion between the Liberals and 
25 Cecil to Devonshire, December 2, 1903, Devonshire Pa;ers, item 340.3011. 
26 Devonshire to Rosebery, December 12, 1903, "Copy, Devonshire Papers, item 
340.3038. 
27 Devonshire to Rosebery, December 15, 1903, Devonshire Papers, item 340.3039. 
28 Gladstone to Campbell-Bannerman, December 21, 1903, "Copy," Asquith Papers, 
vol. 46, folios 112-113, Bodleian Library, Oxford. 
29 "Memorandum of a Conversation by Lord James of Hereford," December 21, 1903, 
Asquith Papers, vol. 10, folios 124-127. 
so Campbell-Bannerman to Gladstone, December 25, 1903, "Private," Campbell-Ban-
nerman Papers, Additional MSS, 41217, folio 67. 
31 Devonshire to Spencer, January 2, 1904, Spencer Papers. 
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Unionist Free Traders is possible."3 2 On the day of the Liberal meeting, 
James wrote to Asquith attempting to put pressure on the Liberal Imperial-
ists to unseat their radical leader: "The Duke could not if he tried bring 
our Unionist F[ree] T[rade] members into line with you so long as Campbell-
Bannerman is to lead them-our reports on this head are unanimous."3 3 
At the meeting it was decided that Spencer should contact Devonshire, 
stressing that the Liberals would only assist the Unionist Free traders if the 
latter voted for the Liberal fiscal amendment.34 The Liberals made few 
concessions. The Duke's reply carried things a little further as he grudgingly 
agreed to Spencer's ultimatum about the amendment. He also gave evi-
dence of his own uneasy hold over some of his followers when he implored 
the Liberals to keep the negotiations about seats secret, "especially from 
Hicks Beach.''35 Thus, factions were moving within factions. 
Despite the secrecy of the discussions, rumors were rampant that the 
Duke and his friends were about to coalesce with the Liberals. Government 
circles were infected with these portents, and as early as December 26 
Gerald Balfour, President of the Board of Trade and the brother of the 
Prime Minister, had gloomily observed that there could be no excuse for 
the Duke's Lewisham letter unless "he means to go further and throw in 
his lot with the other side. I am inclined to think it is coming to this, and 
the idea of a coalition party, and ( if they succeed in defeating us) a coali-
tion government, formed of Liberals and Free Fooders is once more in the 
air.''36 On January 26, the Daily Telegraph contained a lead article pur-
porting to have all the inside information about communications "between 
Devonshire and Rosebery which have resulted in an embryonic Centre 
Party.'' The Duke responded vigorously to the excitement, for when the 
Prime Minister was at Chatsworth, Sir Alemric Fitzroy, the Clerk of the 
Privy Council, reported that Devonshire "left no doubt in ... [Balfour's] 
mind that he was going over to the opposition even to the length of being 
ready to assume the Premiership as a means of uniting discordant forces.''37 
In anticipation of the Unionist Free Traders coming into line with them, 
the Liberals began to sound out Nonconformist leaders on their attitude 
toward helping the Unionist Free Traders. In response to Gladstone's sug-
gestion about "taking the pulse of the Free Church bosses," James Bryce-
32 Cox to Spencer, December 18, 1903, Spencer Papers. 
S3 James to Asquith, January 5, 1904, Asquith Papers, vol. 96, folio 31. 
S4 Spencer to Devonshire, January 7, 1904, Devonshire Papers, item 340.3056. 
35 Devonshire to Spencer, January 11, 1903, Devonshire Papers. 
36 Gerald Balfour to Austen Chamberlain, December 26, 1903, Austen Chamberlain 
Papers, AC 17/60, Birmingham University Library. 
37 Sir Alemric Fitzroy, Me11t0irs, London, n.d., I, 180. 
38 Gladstone to Campbell-Bannerman, January 14, 1904, Campbell-Bannerman Papers, 
Additional MSS, 41720, folio 77. 
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the Liberal most trusted by the Nonconformists-contacted Dr. John Clif-
ford, who was the leading opponent of the Education Act. Clifford replied 
that he and his associates would wait on developments arising from the 
forthcoming fiscal debate.39 
The first fortnight in January represented the maximum period of free-
trade anxiety about Chamberlain's campaign. On January 12, Asquith wrote 
to Spencer about the Liberal plans for a free trade pact: "The situation is so 
unstable that a crisis may come at any moment and there ought to be no 
delay in making whatever arrangements are practicable for electoral pur-
poses."40 Three days later Campbell-Bannerman told Spencer that Glad-
stone was "urgent for an arrangement with the Duke and his men."41 But 
then the protectionist boom broke as Tariff Reformers lost a series of by-
elections. Commencing with the victory at Norwich on January 15, the 
Liberals won three contests by February 13. The Standard, one of the 
Unionist papers not committed to tariff reform, concluded on January 18 
from the result at Norwich that it was "a profound error to believe the 
country was being swept for Protection." The St. James Gazette, a dedicated 
Tariff Reform paper, was forced to acknowledge on January 21 that all the 
talk about Chamberlain "sweeping the country" was "prematurely sanguine." 
This crash of Chamberlainism had profound consequences. It made the 
Liberals more independent of Unionist Free Trade support as the parlia-
mentary fiscal debate came to a close on February 15. Indeed, Devonshire 
had remarked to Spencer as early as January 31, "I dare say you will be 
able to defeat Protection by yourselves."42 
In the light of these setbacks for tariff reform, Balfour felt able to make 
significant concessions in an attempt to prevent the Unionist Free Traders 
from voting for the Liberal fiscal amendment. Although ill in bed, he 
ordered his lieutenants to disavow the full Chamberlain policy by firmly 
denying that the government supported a tax on food and a general tariff. 
Only the administration's advocacy of retaliation was stressed by the Bal-
fourites in the cabinet. The strident Tariff Reformers in the administration 
bravely but futilely put forward the whole Glasgow program for the absent 
Chamberlain, who had retired, exhausted from his speaking tour, to Egypt 
for a holiday. 
The fiscal debate ended on February 15 with what the Daily Telegraph 
called "far and away the most critical division that has occurred since ... 
Mr. Gladstone's first Home Rule Bill was defeated."43 Despite the Prime 
89 Clifford to Bryce, February 2, 1904, Bryce Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford. 
40 Asquith to Spencer, January 12, 1904, Spencer Papers. 
41 Campbell-Bannerman to Spencer, January 15, 1904, Spencer Papers. 
42 Devonshire to Spencer, January 31, 1904, Spencer Papers. 
43 February 15, 1904. 
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Minister's concessions, twenty-seven Unionist Free Traders voted against the 
government and fourteen abstained. Although the government was badly 
shaken, it still came through the division with a majority of fifty-one. The 
sixty-five M.P.'s who had met to elect Devonshire President of the Free 
Food League on October 23 had represented the peak of Unionist Free 
Trade strength in the House of Commons. Thereafter, tariff reform pres-
sure in the constituencies and a reluctance on the part of some Unionist Free 
Traders to oppose Balfour had resulted in the parliamentary representation 
of the Free Food League falling to fifty-one by February, 1904.44 Since the 
Unionist majority midway through February stood at ninety-four, this mem-
bership was still sufficient to destroy the government if all of the Unionist 
Free Traders had voted with the Liberals.411 However, although Balfour 
survived the division, the magnitude of the defection had caused one recent 
historian to conclude that this was a blow from which the party never really 
recovered. 46 
Sandars, private secretary and confidant of Balfour, and the government 
whips were staggered by the size of the revolt. After all the concessions 
made, Sandars thought that almost all the Unionist Free Traders would have 
voted against the amendment. He wrote a long account of the whole debate 
to the convalescing Balfour. "It is perfectly clear that the only thing which 
has saved us from disaster has been the most rigid adherence to Sheffield 
[referring to Balfour's previously mentioned policy of retaliation]." He con-
ceded that the number of recalcitrants exceeded their worst estimates and 
maintained that the Duke's "advice to them last week to vote against the 
Government determined many of them and the dramatic way it was given 
... was engineered by Winston [Churchill].'' Sandars, however, pointed 
out one consolation. The division had been a great disappointment to the 
Liberals, who had hoped to tum the administration out, and this disappoint-
ment had led to dissension and rancour between the two free-trade groups: 
"Now the division was a great disappointment to the Opposition. In their 
estimates our numbers were to be down to the vanishing point. Accordingly, 
smarting from their sense of failure, they have met our malcontents with a 
cold smile . . ., and observe that, after all, there may be greater difficulties 
in the way of party support in the constituencies than they had imagined."47 
44 See the list of the fifty-one Unionist free-trader M.P.'s, dated August, 1904, in the 
Elliot Papers. 
411 The Westminster Gazette on December 31, 1903, placed the government majority 
at ninety-seven. From January 1 to February 15, 1904, the Unionists lost three by-
elections. 
46 Eric Alexander 3rd Viscount Chilston, Chief Whip: The Political Life and Times 
of Aretas Akers-Douglas, 1st Viscount Chilston, London, 1961, p, 327. 
47 Sandars to Balfour, February 22, 1904, "Confidential," Balfour Papers, Additional 
MSS, 49672, folios 79-83. 
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Balfour took seriously Sandar's estimates of the dangerous situation 
created by the Unionist Free Traders. He held his administration to the 
policy of retaliation as late as the 1906 election. Because tariff reform 
slumped badly at the polls during 1904 and 1905, the Prime Minister could 
resist Chamberlain's requests to go beyond the Sheffield speech. By his 
stand, Balfour broke the free-trade threat to the government from within 
his party. 
The negotiations of December, 1903, to February, 1904, marked the 
zenith of Liberal-Unionist Free Trade cooperation. The Liberals were so 
confident after February of winning the next election that they refused to 
support Unionist Free Traders unless members of this group would pledge 
themselves to the whole Liberal program. After the debate, references to 
Unionist Free Traders, save for occasional constituency settlements, almost 
completely dropped out of the correspondence of the Liberal leaders. 
They felt the future belonged to them and that people such as Devonshire 
and Goshen were worn-out old men with whom it was pointless to carry on 
further negotiations. 
Chamberlain's failure to carry the country for tariff reform caused the 
Unionist Free Trade hierarchy and most rank-and-file Tory Free Traders to 
disassociate themselves from further cooperation with the Liberals. This 
official attitude resulted in great tensions within the group as a number of 
Unionist Free Traders continued to desire an arrangement with the Liberals. 
Arthur Elliot, editor of the Unionist Free Trade periodical, the Edinburgh 
Review, pointed out this problem to Lord Cromer when that former pro-
consul became President of the Unionist Free Trade Club: "the difficulty 
has always been when it comes to action that the club is divided in opinion, 
not as to the merits of Free Trade, but whether Free Trade Unionists can 
ally themselves with the Liberals and would be wise as a matter of political 
expediency in doing so."48 
With the failure of the Unionist Free Traders to work with the Liberals 
in a manner resembling the alliance between the Liberal Unionists and the 
Conservatives after 1886, seventeen of the Free Fooders crossed the floor and 
became Liberals. These men, of whom the most important was Churchill, 
knew it was futile to exist as an amorphous body suspended in a political 
twilight between distaste of the Liberals and ineffectual resentment at both 
Balfour and Chamberlain. Those free traders who remained with their party 
were ignored by Balfour and by the Liberals, and they were driven from 
48 Elliot to Cromer, May 17, 1908, Cromer Papers, P.R.O. Foreign Office Papers, Series 
633, vol. 18. 
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political life by the Tariff Reformers. By January, 1910, their demise was 
all but complete. Frederick Lambton, a prominent Unionist Free Trader, 
lamented to Cromer: "The new House of Commons has only one Unionist 
Free Trader now ... Hugh Cecil, and he sits for a University."49 
49 Lambton to Cromer, January 31, 1910, Cromer Papers, P.R.O. Foreign Office Papers, 
Series 633, vol. 18. 
THE END OF THE AMERICAN WATCH ON THE RHINE 
Ar.ExANDER R. STOESEN 
In January, 1923, The United States Army had been on occupation duty 
in Germany for more than four years. During this time the size of the force 
had dwindled to 1,200 men from a peak strength of more than 260,000.1 
Until then, the troops seemed destined to remain in the Rhineland indefinite-
ly without an explicit purpose. The pace of events suddenly quickened, 
however, and the United States withdrew, thus ending the last visible sign 
of wartime "association" with the Allies. 
American participation in the occupation was characterized by puncti-
lious observance of the rules of international law and a relaxed, easy-going 
manner in dealing with the Germans, who spotted this from the start. In 
early December, 1918, a newspaper in Trier observed: "What is most con-
spicuous about the Americans is the assurance and the peaceful manner in 
which they perform their duties. We hear no strident sounds or insolence 
... much less a haughty mein, but always a friendly smile."2 
The Americans in turn found Germany and the Germans surprisingly 
pleasant. Douglas MacArthur recalled that the troops 
thoroughly enjoyed . . . the warm hospitality of the population, their well-
ordered way of life, their thrift and geniality forged a feeling of mutual respect 
and esteem. We had often boasted of "watering our horses in the Rhine," but 
now we were there and the exultation seemed to have disappeared. In its place 
came a realization of the inherent dignity and stature of the great German 
nation.a 
In January, 1919, the Kansas journalist, William Allen White, visited the 
headquarters of Major General Joseph T. Dickman, commander of the Third 
Army-the original occupation force. He discovered a "fine old German-
American with a deep contempt for French works and ways ... [who] 
banged away at the French with gusto and eloquence." White noted that the 
American "psychology of occupation" was characterized by "a policy of kind-
ness toward the German people in their humiliation and distress."4 
Major General Henry T. Allen, who served as occupation commander 
from July 2, 1919, until the withdrawal, explained that he followed a policy 
of "fair play and a square deal."5 In time, the Germans would say that "the 
1 The Armistice and Related Documents, vol. 10 of United States Army in the World 
War, 1917-1919, 17 vols., Washington, 1948, p. 53. 
2 Quoted in Henry T. Allen, The Rhineland Occupation, fudianapolis, 1927, p. 26. 
3 Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences, New York, 1964, p. 81. 
4 William Allen White, The Autobiography of William Allen White, New York, 1946, 
pp. 568, 575. 
5 Henry T. Allen, My Rhineland Journal, Indianapolis, 1923, p. v. 
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American had less discord with the citizens of Coblenz and had been more 
gentlemanly ... than even the peacetime German garrison."6 Thus, there 
is little wonder that a French general would later comment that "the Ameri-
cans were more German than the Germans themselves."7 
Franco-American relations were never the best during the war, but a 
working arrangement had been hammered out. At the time of the armistice, 
the relationship still lacked the firmness needed to hold it together. Troubles 
began as soon as the Third Army moved into the Rhineland, and General 
Allen pointed out that the troublemakers were not Germans. 8 Thus emerged 
a pattern of growing Franco-American estrangement, paralleled by growing 
German-American friendship. 
In spite of the trouble, the French wanted the Americans to remain in the 
Rhineland in order to keep up the appearance of allied unity. 9 The Ameri-
can flag flying over Coblenz meant tacit approval of French tactics and pol-
icy; nevertheless, the French constantly harassed the Americans. The French 
first sought to maintain tactical control over the Third Army, only to receive 
the blunt reply that the Army moved only "on direct order of General Uohn 
J.] Pershing."10 Other French provocations within the American zone in-
cluded sending in signal and railway units in an effort to establish control 
over communications, attempting to foster the separatist movement, trying 
to dismantle fortifications, and making numerous attempts to bypass the civil 
administration of the Interallied Rhineland High Commission in order to 
institute a harsh and capricious military regime.11 
The most apt description of the American position in the Rhineland from 
1918 to 1923 would be "neutral observer." The United States maintained a 
policy of "unofficial representation" and did not vote on the Interallied 
Rhineland High Commission. Until May 20, 1920, Pierrepont B. Noyes of 
Oneida, New York, served as American delegate. When Noyes resigned in 
disgust over the activities of the French, General Allen succeeded him as 
observer. Allen, calling himself "high observer," ironically proved to be of 
major significance in restraining the heavy hand of France in the Rhine-
land.12 
Until November 11, 1921, the legal basis of American participation in 
6 American Representation in Occupied Germany, 1922, 1923, Report uf the Assistant 
Chief-of-Staff, G-2, American Forces in Germany; Coblenz, mimeographed, 1923, p. 235. 
7 Ernst H. Fraenkel, Military Occupation ana the Rule of Law, New York, 1944, p. 
107. 
s Allen, The Rhineland Occupation, p. 15. 
9 Paul Tirard, La France sur le Rhin, Douze annees d'occupation rhenane, Paris, 1930, 
p. 221. 
10 Armistice and Related Documents, p. 1111. 
11 Allen, My Rhineland Journal, passim. 
12 Ibid., p. 115. 
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the occupation was the armistice of 1918. The basis after 1921 was the 
Dresel Peace Treaty under which the United States claimed the "rights and 
privileges" stipulated in the Versailles Treaty as they pertained to the 
Rhineland.13 Actually, the United States in effect reserved the right to with-
draw at any convenient moment, for she never went beyond a policy of 
"unofficial representation." This troubled the Germans, the Allies, and some 
Americans, but it was consistent with American policy, because the United 
States sought no reparations and had entered the war with the loose tie of 
"association" with the Allies. It did, however, tend to make for lack of 
clarity. 
The question of the occupation came up during the famous appearance 
of Woodrow Wilson before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 
August, 1919. Senator Hiram Johnson of California questioned Wilson ex-
tensively about it, asking whether the President's views on America's "moral 
obligation" would "compel us to maintain American troops in Europe." 
Wilson replied, "It is the understanding of the other governments that we 
are to retain only enough troops to keep our flag there."14 
Warren G. Harding touched briefly on the issue in Omaha, Nebraska, 
during the 1920 presidential campaign, when he said that "the American 
troops had no business" in Germany and would be brought home as soon as 
"formal peace was declared."111 However, after Harding's first cabinet 
meeting, it was announced that the troops would stay in the Rhineland for 
an indefinite period.16 Official Washington seldom troubled about the oc-
cupation, and General Allen was left to act without definite instructions. 
After asking Henry P. Fletcher, the ambassador to Belgium, why this was so, 
Allen recorded in his diary that "no one knows anything about it and it was 
considered best to give me a free hand to act as circumstances may de-
mand."17 The faith placed in Allen was well-founded; he was to prove as 
able a diplomat as he was a soldier. 
The center of editorial byplay about the occupation was The New York 
Times, which consistently championed American participation as the "sole 
visible sign remaining of the once promising hope of settling the war in the 
common interest of the world,"18 noting that the American presence repre-
sented a "stabilizing" influence and not a military one.19 The same news-
paper claimed that no one except the "left-wing of the Republican party" 
1s U.S., Statutes at Large, XXXII, 1939. 
14 U.S., Senate, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., Document No. 76, pp. 53, 54. 
111 The New York Times, October 8, 1920. 
16 Ibid., March 9, 1921. 
17 Allen, My Rhineland Journal, p. 362. 
1s The New York Times, July 30, 1921. 
19 Ibid., July 2, 1921. 
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wanted the Americans to leave.20 This assertion came shortly after Senator 
Hiram Johnson had demanded in July, 1921, the recall of the troops on the 
Rhine and Representative Hamilton Fish of New York had submitted a 
resolution to the same effect. Johnson had announced that the troops were 
kept in Germany "under an arduous and arbitrary military policy."21 
The idea that there was anything arduous about duty in Germany was 
put to rest by Senator William Brown McKinley of Illinois, who visited Ger-
many in the summer of 1921 and found the troops content to remain as 
long as possible. He quoted a soldier as saying: "A shave costs us 11h cents 
in American money, and everything else is in the same proportion." Mc-
Kinley also pointed out the falling price of grain in Illinois and urged re-
tention of the troops in the Rhineland as a "good business investment," which 
would "bring back a market for the excess products of the United States." 
Moreover, the American presence in Germany would allay the fears of 
France, enable her to reduce military expenditures, and help pay off her 
debts to the United States.22 
In spite of the pleas of some members of Congress and such papers as 
The New York Times, a sudden announcement came in March, 1922, that 
the entire American contingent would be withdrawn by June. This an-
nouncement created a flurry of activity. General Allen sent a long message 
to Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, explaining that the Interallied 
Rhineland High Commission was "unanimous in asking that the flag re-
main" in the interest of "peace and stabilization."23 The German govern-
ment also requested the retention of the American troops. The Harding 
administration thereupon reversed its decision and announced that the 
Eighth Infantry Regiment would remain in the Rhineland, but it would 
consist of not more than 1,200 men.24 
During the latter half of 1922, the policy of the United States regarding 
the occupation shifted, was unclear, and contrasted sharply with that of 
the French, who by this time apparently had abandoned the idea that 
allied unity served them. The change was outlined in the secret Dariac 
Report, which found its way into the hands of the press. This report re-
ferred to "a long drawn out policy ... which, little by little, will detach from 
Germany a free Rhineland under the military guard of France and Bel-
gium."26 In an August, 1922, reply to General Allen's warning of a possible 
20 Ibid., July 30, 1921. 
21 Ibid., July 5, 1921. 
22 U.S., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 1922, LXI, 6356, 6357. 
23 Allen to Secretary of State, March 24, 1922, Henry T. Allen Papers, Box 35, Library 
of Congress. 
24 The New York Times, March 21, June 5, 1922. 
26 Louis Adrien Dariac, The Dariac Report: Ruhr, Rhineland and Saar, Paris, 1922, 
p. 4. 
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French invasion of the Ruhr, the State Department indicated: "Should the 
French go into the Ruhr, it would be better for the American forces to be 
withdrawn without any exchange of letters, thus letting France know in 
unequivocal terms that its policy was disapproved."26 This was the most 
definite statement that the Harding administration made. 
The American command in Germany was confronted during the re-
mainder of the year by conflicting reports about the administration's in-
tentions. At one point, Secretary of War John W. Weeks said, "As long as 
the cloud of trouble hovers over Europe, General Allen will remain on the 
Rhine.''27 Then came a rumor that the troops would be brought home in 
November.28 The only definite administration action taken were the an-
nouncements in November that no more replacements would be sent to 
Germany,29 and that there would be "no change in the policy of leaving a 
small body of troops on the Rhine for the present.''80 This news was re-
ceived with "undisguised pleasure" in Berlin, where it was hoped the Ameri-
cans would remain to "testify to French deeds and cupidity.''81 
The Harding administration announced in December, 1922, that it would 
"bring the American troops home only at such a time that no significance 
will be attached to the order."82 The New York Times reported that some 
government officials had "been in favor of such action for some time past, 
but the time had not appeared opportune for putting this into effect.''83 
Time was rapidly running out. On December 6, Paul Tirard, the French 
High Commissioner, informed General Allen of the probability of a French 
occupation of the Ruhr to secure additional guarantees for the collection of 
reparations.84 A reparations conference broke up on January 4, 1923, over 
a seemingly "irreconcilable" conflict between Great Britain and France.811 
The French indicated that they would collect reparations by force, resulting 
in what Arnold Toynbee described as the "third and most disastrous phase 
of the Reparations problem."86 The American observer on the Reparations 
Commission, Roland W. Boyden, credited the Germans with a '1arge mea-
sure of success" in paying reparations and insisted that Germany alone was 
not to blame for the reparations crisis. He denounced the Versailles Treaty 
as "impossible.''87 
26 American Representation, p. 85. 
27 Allen, My Rhineland Journal, p. 448. 
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At the same time, the United States Senate took up the question of the 
presence of the American army in Germany. Senator William E. Borah 
asked, "Why is an American army over there? .... We must be there for 
some purpose; we must be there to effect a result." The Idaho "irreconcil-
able" concluded that the United States was doing exactly "what was pro-
vided in the Treaty, namely . . . [guaranteeing] the territorial integrity of 
France against Germany." He would "prefer the Treaty" to similar, but 
independent, action of the administration, but his real desire was with-
drawal.38 
On January 5, Senator James A. Reed of Missouri submitted a resolution 
calling on the President to "act at once to cause the return of all troops now 
stationed in Germany."39 According to Reed, this would extricate America 
from the "hellpot they are brewing over there,'' and serve notice to the 
world that the United States intended to keep out of the quarrels of other 
nations.40 Democratic minority leader Gilbert M. Hitchcock of Nebraska 
sided with his former opponent to announce that the "psychological 
moment" had come to effect a withdrawal.41 Other Democrats, including 
Oscar W. Underwood of Alabama and Kenneth McKellar of Tennessee, 
opined that the United States had no business in the occupation. Almost 
alone, Senator James W. Wadsworth of New York urged keeping the troops 
in Germany in the vague hope that "at some time, in some way they may be 
useful."42 
After the addition of a paragraph denying any "unfriendly attitude to-
ward any nation or nations in Europe,'' Reed's resolution was approved, 
fifty-seven to six, on January 6.43 On the affirmative side were "isolationists, 
Versailles Treaty irreconcilables, Lodge Reservationists, mild reservationists, 
and out and out advocates of the Treaty and League Covenant."44 There 
could be little doubt but that the Senate meant to register disapproval of 
the threat of French occupation of the Ruhr, and the most ardent Wilsonillns 
united with their former opponents to put this point across. 
The next day, Senator Joseph T. Robinson accused the Harding adminis-
tration of being slow to act and of hiding the real "circumstances and facts" 
surrounding the retention of American troops in Germany. In the Arkansas 
Democrat's opinion, "the ship of state is drifting without chart or compass, 
the helmsman [Hughes] apparently asleep at the wheel." It was incompre-
38 U.S., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., LXIV, 932, 933. 
39 Ibid., p. 1276. 
40 Ibid., p. 1351. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., p. 1353. 
43 Ibid., p. 1361. 
44 The New York Times, January 8, 1923. 
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hensible to Robinson that "after refusing for two years to go in we decline 
to come out."45 
Partial mobilization by the French proceeded with seventeen military 
trains passing through Coblenz on January 8.46 Secretary of State Hughes 
warned the French ambassador that if France "started to go into the Ruhr 
our troops would be withdrawn," but the only reaction was the withdrawal 
of French troops from Allen's command.47 On January 11, word reached 
General Allen that "in the judgment of the President, the time has come 
to carry out the complete withdrawal of American troops on the Rhine,''48 
an event which reportedly met with "overwhelming approval at both ends 
of the capitol."49 
In Coblenz it had the opposite effect. A feeling of gloom descended on 
both Americans and Germans.50 The American soldier had been "tumbled 
... off the top of the world."51 The New York Times reported that "the 
majority of them are pulling up by the roots the life they learned to love. 
It is not a regiment, but a colony that is being moved."52 
The Germans took the American action as an "emphatic ... visible sign 
of American protest against French aggression."53 One account pointed out 
that the United States intended "to let the world know who the real dis-
turber of the peace it."54 But, by the time of the actual withdrawal German 
editorial praise had turned, into bitterness with the accusation that the 
Germans had been left to cope with a "military despotism determined to 
destroy Germany.''55 German Foreign Minister Baron von Rosenberg said 
that America had left Germany "defenseless."56 American idealism had 
"disappeared in thin vapor."5 7 
The British agreed with the Germans that the withdrawal was "a most 
emphatic gesture of disapproval of the French policy.'' Some newspapers 
called upon the British to withdraw and agreed with the Boyden thesis that 
the Versailles Treaty was "impossible.'' A major concern of the British was 
that the French action might "harden" opinion in America and thus end 
45 U.S., Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., LXIV, 1471. 
46 American Representation, p. 189. 
47 U.S., Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United 
States 1923, 2 vols., Washington, 1938, II, 47; cited hereafter as Foreign Relati011S. 
48 Ibid., p. 192. 
49 The New York Times, January 11, 1923. 
50 Ibid., January 12, 1923. 
51 Ibid., January 11, 1923. 
52 Ibid., January 13, 1923. 
53 Ibid., January 12, 1923, quoting Berliner Tageblatt. 
54 Ibid., quoting Vossiche Zeitung. 
55 Ibid., January 26, 1923, quoting Coblenz Lokal-Anzeiger. 
56 Ibid., January 26, 1923. 
57 Ibid., quoting Cologne Allgemeine Zeitung. 
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"that help which Europe must have if she is to recover." The British feared 
that the United States would have every reason to keep her purse strings 
closed.58 
The French occupation of the Ruhr on January 12 was accompanied by 
official proclamations as to the "absolutely pacific" nature of the French ob-
jective. It was stated that there was "no intention of undertaking a military 
or political occupation."59 The only American who tried to relieve the Ruhr 
crisis was General Allen, who called an informal meeting of high commis-
sioners on January 13 to "suggest a renewal of negotiations on the whole 
issue." The commissioners showed a "very sympathetic attitude," but it was 
no longer a matter of Allen's personal diplomacy.60 
Allen received a sharply worded message from the State Department, 
telling him that "the American government does not desire any suggestions 
by its representatives without the directions of the department."61 Allen 
replied that his action was "based on the close personal relations existing 
between the civilian and military heads of the countries represented here 
and myself." He added that he regretted his "humane intentions" should 
have been annoying and that he would observe the State Department's 
caution "to the letter."62 
In time, the Germans resorted to passive resistance, and chaos resulted, 
but the French, once committed to their course of action, held to it under 
Premier Raymond Poincare and insisted that the American withdrawal did 
not signify disapproval of French policy. 63 The French press generally sup-
ported the action of its government and accused the United States of being 
"the cause of all the trouble."64 Poincare spent the remainder of 1923 trying 
to create favorable world opinion. 65 
The ceremonial lowering of the American Hag took place on January 24, 
and the last American troops in Europe sailed for home. Early in March, 
the United States issued a statement on the Ruhr occupation to the effect 
that it would be viewed "purely as a question of fact irrespective of any 
consideration as to the legality or propriety of the action taken by France."66 
58 Ibid., January 11, 1923, quoting London Daily Mail, London Daily News, West-
minster Gazette, London Daily Telegraph. 
59 American Representation, p. 189. 
60 Allen, My Rhinel,and Journal,, p. 516. 
61 Foreign Rel,ations, II, 53. 
62 Allen to Secretary of State, January 18, 1923, Henry T. Allen Papers, Box 35, Library 
of Congress. 
63 The New York Times, January 12, 1923. 
64 Jbid., January 13, 1923, quoting Paris Midi. 
65 See Raymond Poincare "America Supports our Seizure of the Ruhr," in Classic 
Speeches, Words That Shook the World, edited by Richard Crosscup, New York, 1965, 
pp. 372-376. 
66 Foreign Relations, II, 53. 
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By January, 1923, after nearly six years of association, Franco-American 
relations were severely stained. The American withdrawal overtly indicated 
disapproval of French action and, more than anything else, symbolized the 
end of the association. The French were not deterred by the withdrawal, 
and the other Allies and Germany expressed regret at the American depar-
ture. Congress, on the other hand, was delighted that positive action was 
being taken. It was never clear what purpose was served by American 
participation, and the administration virtually ignored the question until 
the last few months of 1922. General Allen was left to act on his own, and 
he proved effective, for good will was high, and the troops were content 
to remain in the Rhineland as long as possible. But in the long run, with-
drawal did not result in a disassociation with European problems. The 
French method of forcing Germany to pay reparations failed, and the 
United States had to return to Europe with the Dawes and the Young plans. 
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JIM CROW COMES TO SOUTH CAROLINA 1 
ALBERT N. SANDERS, Furman University 
If many South Carolinians who have reached the age of awareness since 
the onset of the Great Depression were asked why South Carolina had Jim 
Crow laws limiting contact between the Caucasion and Negro races to a 
degree unbelievable sixty-eight years ago, they would answer that "it" had 
always been that way since slave times. For example, in 1950 when Gover-
nor J. Strom Thurmond appointed .!:l Negro physician to the Hospital Ad-
visory Council, a political opponent charged that Thurmond had ended 
"Wade Hampton's era of segregation" in state government.2 Most white 
persons accepted this denunciation as valid, despite the fact that South 
Carolinians fifty-two years old or older were living when the state legislature 
passed its first Jim Crow law. 
In the antebellum period, slavery made a segregation code both unneces-
sary and impractical. Slavery was a "centripetal force" creating its own 
peculiar interracial associations as the overseer or owner constantly super-
vised the working and living conditions of his force. s Slavery was a solution 
to both the labor question and the race question. It was only after emanci-
pation, the collapse of the Confederacy in the spring of 1865, and the pas-
sage of the Thirteenth Amendment had removed the master-slave relation-
ship that a new system of "proper" relations between free Negro and free 
white citizens had to be developed. 
Since 1865, three systems of white-colored relationships have been tried: 
the Radical or Carpetbagger solution from 1868 until 1876; the Conservative 
or Hamptonite solution from 1877 to 1898; and the Reactionary or Jim-
Crow solution since 1898 with some tempering in this last generation. 
The Radical solution was a political solution with almost no social 
equality but considerable "public equality."4 At the national level it en-
visioned the enfranchisement of the freedmen, the disenfranchisement of the 
white ex-Confederate leadership, and the use of the Negro vote in the ex-
Confederate states to maintain Radical Republican majorities in Congress. 
The Radical Republican leaders in Washington were effecting a revolution 
in the national government and reorienting the United States from a South-
ern and Western agrarian-dominated economy to one dominated by the in-
1 The author is indebted to Comer Vann Woodward's Strange Career of Jim Crow, 
New York, 1957, for the line of thought which stimulated the development of this paper. 
2 Columbia State, June 25, 1950, as quoted by George Brown Tindall, South Carolina 
Negroes, 1877-1900, Columbia, S. C., 1952, p. 306. 
3 Joel Williamson, After Slavery, The Negro in South Carolina During Reconstruction, 
Chapel Hill, N. C., 1965, p. 274. 
" Ibid., p. 279. 
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dustrial and financial interests of the East. To accomplish this they needed 
Congressmen and Senators who followed the Radical Republican leadership 
in Washington without question. This same Radical Republican leadership 
cared little about what happened in South Carolina or any other ex-Con-
federate state. 5 
To accomplish these ends, Radical Republicans passed the Reconstruc-
tion acts and pushed through the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments. 
In South Carolina, enforcement of this legislation meant the setting aside 
of the native, white, Restoration government established under the policies 
of President Andrew Johnson in 1865 and the calling of a new constitutional 
convention in 1868, chosen by an electorate which included the newly-en-
franchised Negroes but excluded persons who had voluntarily aided the 
Confederacy. This convention, with a majority of its members Negroes, 
drew up a good constitution, which was so administered that control of the 
state was maintained by the Negroes and Carpetbaggers, causing what 
William Watts Ball called the "loathsome ulcers of Reconstruction."6 The 
Constitution of 1868 was the legal expression of the victory of the Radical 
solution and of Negro supremacy.7 For eight years the Radical solution 
was the official policy of South Carolina in race relations. A Negro majority 
sat in the House of Representatives, and a sizable number sat in the Senate .. 
Between 1868 and 1876, eight Negroes were elected to Congress, two were 
lieutenant governor, one sat on the state Supreme Court, and one was 
secretary of state. 8 
During the period of the Radical solution, the General Assembly passed 
a series of civil-rights acts prohibiting racial discrimination on common 
carriers and in theaters, hotels, and places of amusement.9 Other laws 
guaranteed all persons equal access to the courts and to the jury box, and 
juries were required to be apportioned racially according to the community 
in balance of whites and blacks.10 Separate schools for the races were pro-
hibited by the constitution and by implementing law.11 
While the Radical solution resulted in political non-discrimination against 
11 See George Fort Milton, The Age of Hate, Hamden, Conn., 1965, for an able 
presentation of this point of view. 
6 William Watts Ball, The State That Forgot, fodianapolis, 1932, p . 15. 
7 Hampton McNeely Jarrell, Wade Hampton and the Negro: The Road Not Taken, 
Columbia, S. C., 1950, p. 162. 
s Tindall, p. 9. 
9 South Carolina, General Assembly, Acts and Joint Resolutions of the General As-
sembly of the State of South Carolina ... Designed to Form a Part of the Fourteenth 
Volume of the Statutes at Large .. .. , Columbia, S. C., 1872, pp. 179, 386-388; cited 
hereafter as Statutes at Large. 
10 Ibid. , p. 337. 
11 Constitution of the State of South Carolina of 1868, Article X, published in Statutes 
at Large, XIV ( 1868-1871 ), 22-23; Statutes at Large, XIV ( 1868-1871 ), 339-348. 
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Negroes to a high degree, the best efforts of Negro leaders to secure social 
acceptance by the largely disenfranchised but economically powerful native 
whites were relatively unsuccessful. Social acceptance seems to have been 
as rare in this period as it was at the height of the era of segregation. A 
recent scholar maintains that this absence of social acceptance was the 
result of dual withdrawal. The native white community separated from 
the Negro as a means of minimizing and avoiding the problems which they 
felt would arise from the eradication of slavery and the disallowing of poli-
tical controls of the freedman. In short, segregation, to these native whites, 
was a substitute for slavery. On the other hand, the Negro-suspicious, 
chaffed by the white attitudes of superiority, insecure as to the proper pos-
ture for a freeman-also withdrew from contact with the white. For ex-
ample, he withdrew from the churches of his former masters and formed 
the new African congregations even as the white man withdrew from the 
mixed schools to leave them segregated in fact. In the military services, 
segregation had been established during the war and continued. This was 
true particularly of the South Carolina militia.12 The lack of social accep-
tance was true even among the white radicals and carpetbagger officials.18 
To the native white South Carolinian, the Radical solution was an "im-
posed" solution and endured only so long as it was enforced by militant 
Radical Republicanism. By 1874 the North was growing weary of the cru-
sade for the Negro. The depression of the 1870's the changing nature of the 
national economy, the unrest in the Midwest, the aging of the leadership, the 
corruption of the Grant administration, and the failure of the Negro to 
measure up to preconceived notions of his ability-all contributed to the 
decreasing concern for the freedman. Perhaps if the old anti-slavery leaders 
like Thaddeus Stevens, Charles Sumner, and Benjamin F. Butler had en-
dured, the victory of the Radicals might have been more nearly permanent. 
But younger leaders like Rutherford B. Hayes, James G. Blaine, and Roscoe 
Conklin, with less zeal for the Negro, took their places. These practical 
politicians, concerned primarily with the development of the industrial and 
financial interests in the North, turned from supporting Negro rights in the 
South to more profitable and practical pursuits.14 
As the Republican leadership on the national scene shifted from the 
Radicals of the post-war years to the conservative, business-minded leader-
ship which characterized that party in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
12 Williamson, pp. 275-299. 
13 See John William De Forest, A Union Officer During Reconstruction, edited by 
James H. Cronshore and David M . Potter, 1948, passim, for this phenomenon in Green-
ville, S. C. 
14 John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, New York, 1947, p. 327. 
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century, 111 the native whites of South Carolina, largely reenfranchised by 
the Amnesty Act of 1870, moved to reestablish white man's government in 
the state. After a bitter fight in the Conservative (Democratic) conventions 
of 1876, they rallied behind Wade Hampton's leadership to defeat the Re-
publicans in that election. 
The famous red-shirt campaign of 1876 is well-known.16 Hampton suc-
ceeded in getting some Negro support and Negro Red Shirt Clubs marched 
in Hampton parades. Hampton won the governorship by a narrow margin, 
and a majority of the House of Representatives was also Democratic, 17 but 
the Radical Republicans, led by Daniel Chamberlain, refused to yield the 
reins of government, and from late November, 1876, until April, 1877, South 
Carolina had dual government. When President Rutherford B. Hayes with-
drew the Federal troops sustaining the Chamberlain government in April, 
1877, Chamberlain and many of the Carpetbaggers left the state, and the 
South Carolina Negroes were left to the tender mercies of the Hampton 
Conservatives. 
Wade Hampton and his Conservatives maintained that a proper solu-
tion of white-colored relationships should involve four basic attitudes: that 
there was a superior and a subordinate class; that each class should be guar-
anteed its status; that each class had its own obligations and responsibilities; 
and that each class should be protected in its rights. They felt that segre-
gation and ostracism were unnecessary humiliations that would discourage 
Negro improvement and hamper the development of the state. The Negro 
must vote, if qualified. He must be allowed to progress, if qualified. He 
must be accepted as a partner-not as an equal-in the effort to develop 
the state and bring both white and Negro up to the scale economically and 
culturally.18 
The Conservatives would accept in good faith the Thirteenth, Four-
teenth, and Fifteenth amendments and would recognize all citizens as equal 
under the law. During the campaign Wade Hampton told a crowd at Dar-
lington: "Not one single right enjoyed by the colored people today shall be 
taken from them. They shall be equals under the law, of any man in South 
Carolina. And we further pledge that we will give better facilities for edu-
111 See Comer Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction, Boston, 1951, for a discerning 
analysis of this change. 
16 Francis Butler Simkins and Robert Hilliard Woody give an account of this cam-
paign in South Carolina During Reconstruction, Chapel Hill, N. C., 1932, pp. 474-541. 
17 George Brown Tindall, "The Campaign for the Disenfranchisement of Negroes in 
South Carolina," Journal of Southern History, XV (May, 1949), 213. 
18 Jarrell, pp. 122-124; Tindall, S. C. Negroes, p. 22. 
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cation than they have ever had before."19 At Sumter he predicted a time 
when "every colored man will be a Democrat, because they will find that 
their rights will be better protected by that party."20 
Hampton and the Conservatives made their solution of the problem of 
white-colored relations work until near the end of the century. In 1878 a 
former Union officer from Boston, who came South to revisit some of the 
Negroes he had once commanded, wrote after considerable observation that 
Southern whites accept Negro voters "precisely as Northern men in the 
cities accept the ignorant Irish vote,-not cheerfully, but with acquiescence 
in the inevitable; and . . . they are just as ready to conciliate the negro as 
the Northern politician is to flatter the Irishman."21 
Although Negroes were not pushed militantly into the foreground of 
public life as had been the case during Radical Reconstruction, they were 
not eliminated from the public life of South Carolina after Hampton's 
victory in 1876.22 The "public equality" of the Reconstruction period per-
sisted. They continued to vote and to hold some offices throughout the 
period of Bourbon rule. In his administration Hampton appointed at least 
eighty-six Negroes to office-trial justices, jury commissioners, members of 
commissions.23 Former Governor Robert K. Scott reported five months after 
Hampton took office that "Hampton is honestly carrying out the promises 
he made during the campaign. He has already appointed more colored men 
to office than were appointed during the first two years that I was Gover-
nor."24 
Negroes also were elected to office on the Democratic ticket. In Charles-
ton County three of the seventeen Democratic nominees for the House 
were Negro. In Orangeburg, Sumter, Colleton, and Barnwell counties at 
various times part of the Democratic representation was Negro.25 William 
Watts Ball, long-time editor of the Charleston News and Courier, remember-
ed a Democratic convention in the 1880's in Barnwell County where forty-
nine of the two hundred and three delegates were Negroes and where 
several candidates chosen for county offices were Negroes. In 1932 he wrote: 
"These things have long been forgotten in South Carolina and the grand-
10 Wade Hampton, Free Men! Free Ballots! Free Schools!!! The Pledges of Gen. 
Wade Hampton, Democratic Candidate for Governor to the Colored People of South 
Carolina, 1865-1876, a campaign pamphlet published in Charleston in 1876 as quoted 
by Tindall, S. C. Negroes, p. 12, italics eliminated. 
20 Also quoted by Tindall, S. C. Negroes, p. 12. 
21 Thomas Wentworth Higginson, "Some War Scenes Revisited," Atlantic Monthly, 
XLII (July, 1878 ), 8. 
22 Tindall, "The Campaign for the Disenfranchisement," p. 213. 
23 Tindall, S. C. Negroes, p. 22. 
24 As quoted in Woodward, Strange Career, p. 37. 
25 Tindall, S. C. Negroes, p. 23. 
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sons of the white men who could give office to Negroes . . . deny them now 
the small privilege of membership in the party."26 
Strangely, the Conservatives passed no racial legislation.27 Rather, they 
seem to have enforced existing law to the satisfaction of both races. The 
famous British radical and Member of Parliament, Sir George Campbell, 
visited South Carolina and was impressed by the freedom of association be-
tween whites and blacks and the equality with which Negroes shared public 
facilities. He wrote that "the humblest black rides with the proudest white 
on terms of perfect equality, and without the smallest symptom of malice or 
dislike on either side. I was, I confess, surprised to see how completely this 
is the case; even an English Radical is a little taken back at first."28 
Colonel Thomas Wentworth Higginson-militant abolitionist, minister, 
writer, soldier, organizer and commander of the First South Carolina Regi-
ment of Volunteers, a Negro unit recruited in 1862 from around Beaufort-
traveled in South Carolina in 1878 with "the eyes of a tolerably suspicious 
abolitionist." He found the tolerance and acceptance of the Negro on 
trains and street cars, at the pools, in the courts and legislature, on the 
police forces, and in the militia less discriminating than the treatment of 
the Negro in New England.29 A writer in the Atlantic Monthly of January, 
1878, found both races attending funerals and Sunday Schools and also 
commented on the lack of discrimination in public places and on colored 
men appearing on the Democratic ticket.30 In 1885, T. McCants Stewart, a 
South Carolina Negro who had been in Boston ten years, returned to South 
Carolina with a "chip on my Shoulder" to report "true" racial relations in a 
series of letters to the New York Freeman. He found race relations in South 
Carolina similar to these in Providence, R.I. He rode street cars and rail-
roads first class without question. He drank in saloons and at soda bars and 
was courteously served. He ate in white restaurants, saw a Negro police-
man arrest a white man, and, in Charleston, witnessed the review of hun-
dreds of Negro troops. His comment was: "I would say, 'The morning light 
is breaking.' "31 Disappointed at not finding more spectacular things to write 
about, he cut his trip short and returned to New York. Perhaps the comment 
of a Negro politician in 1878 sums it up: "We have no complaint to make 
of Governor Hampton; he has kept his pledge."32 
26 Ball, p. 174. 
27 Francis Butler Simkins, "Race Legislation in South Carolina Since 1865," South 
Atlantic Quarterly, XX ( 1921 ) , 61-71, 165-177. 
28 Quoted in Woodward, Strange Career, pp. 17-18. 
29 Higginson, pp. 1-9. Higginson talked to about 100 of his former troops "whom I 
could trust." See Williamson, p. 17, for a sketch of Higginson. 
so A South Carolinian, "The Result in South Carolina," Atlantic Monthly, XLI ( Jan-
uary, 1878), 11. 
31 Woodward, Strange Career, pp. 21-22. 
82 Quoted in Higginson, "Some War Scenes Revisited," p. 7. 
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It is neither honest nor accurate to give the impression that there was 
no discrimination against Negroes during the period of the Conservative so-
lution. As in the earlier period, there was nominal non-discrimination under 
the law, but in day-to-day practice the Conservatives were conronted re-
peatedly by the reactionary element in the Democratic party and made 
concessions to maintain white unity. There was curtailment of the Negro 
vote by intimidation, fraud, and violence.33 There were Negro Democrats, 
but sometimes this was achieved by economic coercion-threats of discharge 
proscription, or curtailing of credit if the Negro voted the Republican ticket. 
One observer estimated that a third of the Negroes professed Democracy 
and enjoyed the "protecting and petting" of white Democrats.34 In pre-
dominately Negro Republican precincts the polls were placed at awkward, 
out-of-the-way places with travel to them hampered by blocked roads or 
ferries "out of repair."35 
In 1882 a Conservative from Charleston, Edward McCrady, proposed a 
"reform" to end the violence, intimidation, and economic pressure that ac-
companied the white efforts to control the Negro vote. Believing that liter-
acy ought to be the minimum requirement for voting, he introduced, and 
the legislature passed, the Eight Box Law. This law required that at each 
polling place there would be separate ballots and separate ballot boxes for 
each office. If the voter were literate, he could put the proper ticket in the 
proper box. If illiterate, as many Negroes were, the tickets might be put 
in the wrong box and thus become invalid.36 Under this law the Republi-
can vote declined from 91,870 in 1876 to only 13,740 in 1888,37 and the 
threat of the Negro majority in the state to white control of the govern-
mental machinery ceased to exist.38 However, Negroes continued to be 
elected to the legislature: seven in 1884 (one a Democrat), eight in 1886 
(two Democrats), and five in 1888 (two Democrats).39 
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the railroad was the only 
practical means of transportation in the state and both races rode passenger 
trains in large numbers without any law requiring their separation. The use 
of this utility by both races illustartes the curious working of the Conserva-
tive policy of public equality and social separation. The civil-rights act 
passed by the first Reconstruction legislature in 1868 prohibited discrimina-
tion "between persons on account of race, color, or previous condition" by 
83 Tindall, "The Campaign for the Disenfranchisement," p. 213. 
34 A South Carolinian, "The Result in South Carolina," pp. 5-6. 
35 Franklin, p. 329. 
36 Tindall, "The Campaign for the Disenfranchisement," pp. 213-215. 
37 Tindall, S. C. Negroes, p. 73. 
as Jarrell, p. 159. 
3o Ibid. 
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businesses licensed in the state.40 Other legislation prohibited segregation 
of customers because of race by common carriers, restaurants, theaters, or 
hotels.41 Yet the General Railroad Law of 1882 required two waiting rooms 
in every station where tickets were sold.42 While there could be no legal 
provision that one of the waiting rooms be designated for the colored, local 
pressures secured segregation in stations.43 Cheaper passage on second-class 
cars secured de facto segregation on the trains themselves. 44 The Interstate 
Commerce Commission ruled in 1887 that the races could be separated on 
passenger trains if separate cars were "assigned without disadvantage to 
either race."45 The South Carolina Railroad Commission then promptly 
urged the railroads of the state to give "separate but equal" accommodations 
a trial. Excursions to the state fair in 1889 with segregated cars followed 
and were, according to Governor John Peter Richardson, "notably success-
ful, . . . conducing . . . to the pleasure and comfort of the excursionists."46 
The success of the segregated excursions led to the introduction of two bills 
in the legislature calling for separate coaches for white and colored, but the 
Conservatives held fast, and the "separation bills" were defeated.47 A straw 
in the wind, however, was the repeal by this legislature of the twenty-year-
old civil-rights law which had protected the Negroes from public segre-
gation.48 
By 1889 the Conservative leadership of South Carolina politics was 
under severe challenge. Believers in the antebellum ideal of noblesse oblige 
who had no fear of the Negroes as economic competitors, Hampton and his 
clique embodied the best tradition of the friendship of the Southern upper 
classes for the Negro. They had not sought to eliminate the Negro from 
politics but only to eliminate the threat of Negro supremacy.49 The great 
mass of white South Carolinians, however, were unable to maintain the 
40 Statutes at Large, XIV ( 1868-1871), 179. 
41 Ibid., pp. 386-388. 
42 Ibid., XVII (1881-1882), 827. 
43 Eighth Annual Report of the Railroad Commission of the State of South Carolina 
as printed in Reports and Resolutions of the General Assembly of the State of South 
Carolina, Columbia, 1887, I, 876; hereafter cited as Eighth Annual Report of the Rail-
road Commission (1886). 
44 W. Ernest Dou~las, "Retreat from Conservativism: The Old Lady of Broad Street 
Embraces Jim Crow,' Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association, 1958, p. 5. 
45 United States, Interstate Commerce Commission, First Annual Report of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission (1887), Washington, 1887, p. 93. See Second Annual Re-
port of the I.C.C. (1888), p. 105, for a clarification of the ruling. 
46 South Carolina, General Assembly, Journal of the House of Representatives of the 
State oz South Carolina for the Regular Session of 1889, p. 49; hereafter cited as House 
Journa. 
47 Ibid., pp. 12, 22, 60, 359-360. 
48 Ibid., pp. 116, 261, 276-277, 480, 485-487; South Carolina General Assembly, 
Journal of the Senate of the State of South Carolina for the Regular Session of 1889, 
pp. 270-271, 397-398, 416-417, 442-443, 514-519; hereafter cited as Senate Journal. 
49 Jarrell, p. 159. 
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friendly and sympathetic detachment of the Conservatives toward the 
Negro. As the 1880's passed, a depression born of declining cotton prices 
hit the state. Liens became oppressive, and hundreds of white yeomen farm-
ers found themselves losing, or in danger of losing, their land. In their 
desperation, these farmers, faced with the possibility of becoming share-
croppers and in competition with the Negro, began to seek leadership other 
than that of the aristocratic, aging, planter-business-oriented Conservatives. 
From the leaders of these yeomen came the demand for another solution to 
the problem of white-colored relationships-the Reactionary solution. 
The Reactionaries maintained that the Negro was predestined to be an 
inferior caste, capable only of farm, domestic, or unskilled labor. To pre-
serve society, he must be completely disenfranchised, segregated from the 
whites, and kept under the control of the whites. 50 The Reactionary solu-
tion had been enunciated by Martin W. Gary in 1876, and his faction of 
upcountry yeomen farmers had been held in check only by the prestige of 
Hampton. As early as 1878, when it was proposed to send Hampton to 
the United States Senate, there was objection from the Conservatives who 
realized that, without Hampton as its most cohesive force, the Democratic 
party could not maintain its moderate position on the race question.51 The 
extremist group supported the nomination. Hampton, perhaps tired, allowed 
himself to be moved to Washington.52 
With Hampton out of the state and with the emerging of a new gener-
ation influenced by the changing social and economic patterns, the momen-
tum of the Conservatives gradually ran out. Governors Johnson Hagood, 
Hugh S. Thompson, and John Peter Richardson followed the Hampton line, 
but each was a little less vigorous than his predecessor. Hagood told a 
group in Spartanburg on August 15, 1878: "We must obliterate the color 
line in politics, and invite the colored men into our ranks the same as we 
invite the white man, and accord him every right we accord the white 
man."53 Six years later Conservative Hugh S. Thompson in his second in-
augural address expressed slightly less militant sentiments: "The fact that in 
South Carolina all departments of the State Government are controlled by 
one race ... but adds to our responsibilities ... to act with scrupulous jus-
tice and fairness .... The supremacy of the white man in South Carolina 
... is not inconsistent with the free and frank acknowledgment and recog-
50 Guion Griffis Johnson, "The Ideology of White Supremacy, 1876-1910," in Fletcher 
Melvin Green, ed., Essays in Southern History; The James Sprunt Studies in History and 
Political Science, XXX ( 1949), 155-156. 
51 The "Cato" letters in Columbia Daily Register, November, 1878, as discussed in 
Tindall, S. C. Negroes, pp. 36-37. 
52 Tindall, S. C. Negroes, pp. 36, 39; Jarrell, pp. 152-154. 
53 Quoted in Jarrell, p. 131. 
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nition of the political equality of the colored man."54 Five years later, in 
1899, John Peter Richardson, the last of the Conservative governors, said: 
"We believe that the whites must dominate, but at the same time we do not 
refuse local office to the blacks.''55 These quotations show an erosion from 
the militant guarantee of Negro rights in 1878 to only an acceptance of fair 
play in control of the Negro in 1889. As Mart R. Delaney, a trial Negro 
justice of Charleston who was removed from his position, wrote: "I lost 
as soon as they got rid of him [Hampton] by sending him to the U. S. 
Senate, as he was too liberal for the rank and file of the party leaders."56 
The declining militancy of the Conservative governors reflects the pres-
sure exerted by this less liberal rank and file, then led by Benjamin Ryan 
Tillman who had caught up the mantle of the deceased Reactionary, Martin 
Gary. Tillman rallied the yeomen farmers in the late 1880's, seized control 
of the Democratic party machinery in 1890, and led a "Reformer Ticket" to 
victory in that year. 57 In his inaugural address Tillman called for racial 
peace, but he reiterated: "The whites have absolute control of the State 
Government, and we intend at any and all hazards to retain it. The intelli-
gent exercise of the right of suffrage ... is as yet beyond the capacity of the 
vast majority of colored men."58 
Tillman's solution was to eliminate the Negro from politics by drawing 
up a new constitution to replace the "dictated" constitution of 1868. Due 
to resistance from the Conservatives, it took him four years to get the neces-
sary authorization for a referendum on the matter through the legislature. 
The referendum was hotly contested by the Conservatives and the Negroes, 
and the call for a convention was narrowly approved by a vote of 31,402 to 
29,523.59 The Constitution of 1895 embodied the Tillmanite solution, for it 
included residence, literacy, and understanding provisions, which, in the 
hands of an unsympathetic board of registry, prevented most Negroes from 
registering to vote. Additional poll tax provisions hampered the voting of 
those few who were able to register.60 
The disenfranchisement of the Negro by the Constitution of 1895 was 
hailed widely by the Tillmanites as a "reform," a "constructive act of states-
manship," and a perpetual protection of white purity.61 The "black ghosts 
of Reconstruction [which] would run forth and devour white civilization" 
54 House Journal (1884), p. 137. 
55 Columbia Daily Register, Mar 7, 1889, as quoted in Tindall, S. C. Negroes, p. 38. 
56 From letter quoted by Tindall, S. C. Negroes, p . 38. 
57 Francis Butler Simkins, The Tillman Movement in South Carolina, Durham, N. C., 
1926, pp. 103-134. 
58 Senate Journal ( 1890 ), p. 79. 
59 Simkins, Tillman Movement, p. 205. 
60 Constitution of the State of South Carolina of 1895, Article II. 
61 Franklin, p. 337. 
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had been laid to rest. 62 The following year the Democratic party established 
the nominating primary for selecting candidates, opening the door of party 
membership only to those Negroes who had voted for Hampton in 1876. 
This action completed the work begun at the constitutional convention and 
completely eliminated the Negro as a political force in the state for two 
generations. "Just as the Negro-carpetbagger constitution of 1868 was the 
legal expression of Negro supremacy ... so that of 1895 expressed white 
"63 supremacy .... 
Once the Negro was deprived of any direct means of protest, it was 
inevitable that the extremists in control of the state would seek laws which 
would dignify the white man by degrading the Negro. Again the changes 
in the legal position toward separation of the races on trains is a good index 
of the growth of segregationist opinion. In 1890 the Railroad Commission 
had found it "impractical to inaugurate a system of separate cars for white 
and colored passengers."64 However, Ben Tillman's Reformers in the legis-
lature were not of this Conservative opinion. Every year from Tillman's 
victory in 1890 through 1896 bills requiring separate coaches for the races 
were introduced and defeated in the legislature,65 for the "growing senti-
ment for racial segregation had not as yet been sufficiently developed."66 
The United States Supreme Court aided the segregationists in 1896, when 
the Plessy v. Ferguson decision "unlocked the door of the Jim Crow railroad 
car with a constitutional key"67 by recognizing separate but equal facilities 
for the races as constitutional. 68 The following year the Railroad Commis-
sion, its membership then consisting of a Tillmanite majority, reluctantly 
concluded that "We have been slow in arriving at the following conclusion, 
but close observation, extending through the past two or three years, has led 
the Board to believe that the interest of both races would be best advanced 
by requiring the railroads to provide separate accommodations for white and 
colored travelers."69 Thus encouraged, the segregationists in the legislature 
of 1898 introduced a bill requiring the railroads to "provide and operate" 
racially separate coaches or separate compartments in all first-class 
coaches.70 The Conservative minority in the legislature fought a delaying 
62 Simkins, Tillman Movement, p. 205. 
63 Jarrell, p. 162. 
64 Twelfth Annual Report of the Railroad Commission ( 1890), II, 258-259. 
65House Journal (1890), pp. 76, 90, 280, 376; ibid. (1891), pp. 300, 573; ibid. 
(1893), p. 204; ibid. (1894), pp. 104, 148, 297-298, 310-313, 320, 493; Senate Journal 
( 1896), pp. 182, 241, 257, 284, 292, 331, 337. There was no session of the General 
Assembly in 1895. 
66 Simkins, Tillman Movement, p. 141. 
67 Douglas, p. 5. 
68163 U.S. 539 (1896). 
69 Nineteenth Annual Report af the Railroad Commission (1897), I, 126-127. 
10 Senate Journal (1898), p. 98a; House Journal (1898), p. 30. 
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action aided by the Charleston News and Courier, which fired a broadside 
against the extremists, urging the defeat of the bill and the preservation of 
the twenty-year-old Conservative solution of moderation in race relations in 
South Carolina. Editor James C. Hemphill wrote: 
As we have got on fairly well for a third of a century, including a long period of 
reconstruction, without such a measure, we can probably get on as well hereafter 
without it, and certainly so extreme a measure should not be adopted and en-
forced without added and urgent cause. 
He then called attention to what he considered the absurd consequences to 
which such a law might lead once the principle of the theory were conceded: 
If there must be Jim Crow cars on the railroads, there should also be Jim Crow 
cars on the street railways. Also on all passenger boats. . . . If there are to be 
Jim Crow cars, moreover, there should be Jim Crow waiting saloons at all stations, 
and Jim Crow eating houses .. . . There should be Jim Crow sections of the jury 
box, and a separate Jim Crow dock and witness stand in every Court-and a Jim 
Crow Bible for colored witnesses to kiss. It would be advisable also to have a 
Jim Crow section in county auditors' and treasurers' offices for the accommodation 
of colored taxpayers. The two races are dreadfully mixed in offices for weeks 
every year, especially about Christmas .... There should be a Jim Crow depart-
ment for making returns and paying for the privileges and blessings of citizenship. 
Why not save for ourselves all future ingenuity and elaboration on this line by 
establishing two or three Jim Crow counties at once ( and turning them over to 
the colored citizens for their special and exclusive accommodation) ... with an 
honorable understanding that each race should "shinny on its own side" of the 
line strictly, hereafter?71 
The efforts of Conservative editors and lawmakers were in vain, however, 
and the Jim Crow bill of 1898 became law. It required railroads to provide 
separate coaches or compartments for each race on passenger trains, and an 
amendment in 1900 called for separate coaches on all trains on railroads over 
forty miles long.72 An amendment in 1903 required short lines to provide 
separate compartments.73 Other Jim Crow laws prophecied by Hemphill 
were shortly enacted. In 1904 separation of races was required on steam 
ferries.74 The principle was applied in 1905 to electric cars where whites 
were to be seated from the front, the blacks from the rear.75 A law of 1906 
required separation in railroad-station restaurants and on steamboats.76 
Segregation of the tax moneys for school purposes was made law during the 
Coleman Livingston Blease administration. In Hampton's day Gary had 
71 Charleston News and Courier, January 25, 1898, as quoted in Woodward, Strange 
Career, pp. 49-50; also quoted in Douglas, p . 6. 
72 Statutes at Large, XXII (1898), 777-778; XXIII (1900), 457-459. 
73 Jbid., XXIV ( 1903 ), 84. 
74 Ibid., XXIV ( 1904), 438-439. 
75Jbid., XXIV (1905), 954. See also ibid., XXXI (1919), 143, for extension of this 
principle. 
16 Jbid., XXV (1906), 76. 
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protested the two-mill education tax on the grounds that the whites would 
pay nine-tenths of the tax and three-fourths would be spent "educating pic-
caninnies."77 The Blease solution was to have the taxpayer earmark his 
school taxes for white schools, Negro schools, or the general fund. Blease 
also separated the races in the penitentiary. 
South Carolina's factory law of 1915 prohibited textile factories from per-
mitting laborers of different races from working together in the same room 
or using the same entrances, pay windows, exits, doorways, stairways, or 
windows at the same time, or "the same lavatories, toilets, drinking water 
buckets, pails, cups, dippers or glasses" at any time although equal accom-
modations for "all persons employed" were required.78 
A jury law of 1902 allowed qualified voters only in the jury box. 79 Rail-
roads were prohibited in 1917 from loading and unloading white and colored 
passengers at adjoining ends of their cars, and, to provide the height of the 
ridiculous, they were required to put partitions in passenger booths at flag 
stations. 80 Even circuses or traveling tent shows were required to have 
separate entrances as well as separate seating for the races. 81 
By the time the United States entered World War I to "make the world 
safe for democracy," South Carolinians in general accepted white supremacy 
and its corollary Jim Crow as an absolute. The state government had re-
duced contact between the races and defined the "place" of the Negro as a 
subordinate, second-class citizen. It had authorized local governments to 
"provide by reasonable and suitable ordinances for the segregation of the 
races in their respective municipalities."82 With the social segregation of 
the nineteenth century buttressed by the public segregation of the twentieth, 
the Negro, deprived of his agency of protest by the loss of the vote and 
lacking the economic and cultural resources to force reconsideration of the 
Jim Crow solution, had no means of securing in South Carolina the rights 
granted him by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments. 
77 Jarrell, p . 126. 
78 Statutes at Large, XXIX ( 1915), 79. 
79 Ibid., XXIII (1902), 1066. 
80 "Circular 222 of the Railroad Commission of the State of South Carolina," February 
9, 1917, MS file in office of South Carolina Public Service Commission. 
81 Statutes at Large, XXX (1917), 48. 
s2 Ibid., XXIX (1915), 180. 
ANDREW JOHNSON: THE SECOND SWING 
'ROUND THE CIRCLE 
ROBERT J. MooRE 
In the congressional election of 1866 Andrew Johnson made a famous 
and controversial "swing 'round the circle," a tour of several northern states, 
on behalf of candidates favorable to his views. His second "swing 'round 
the circle," the topic of this inquiry, is the revolution in historians' opinions 
of his personality and presidency. These opinions have come full circle since 
the first genuine historical accounts of Reconstruction and of the hapless 
successor to Lincoln. 
The image of an obstinate, egotistical, crude, demagogic Johnson, unfit 
for the presidency was firmly established early in this century by the first 
scholars to exploit the Reconstruction theme. His hardheadedness and his 
lack of dignity caused the defeat of his Reconstruction program and ren-
dered him a leader without a party. These early historians did not question 
Johnson's honesty, but they heavily condemned other facets of his character. 
Lack of flexibility, dignity, and of tact were the keys to his lack of success, 
according to the gentlemanly, upper-middle class historians whose interpre-
tation was dominant for the first two decades of the twentieth century. 
James Ford Rhodes, probably the most important writer in establishing 
this interpretation, was a well-to-do gentleman historian who moved in the 
best circles of Boston and Cambridge society. Socially, his delight was in 
congenial dining companions and good after-dinner conversation. Politically, 
his delight was in stateliness and moderation. William A. Dunning, a histo-
rian and political scientist whose seminars at Columbia University are still 
without parallel in their influence on Reconstruction historiography, was of 
a similar conservative bent. To gentlemen who adhered to the golden mean 
and who expected no less of their public servants, Andrew Johnson's blus-
tery, "Give 'em hell, Harry" style of spontaneous stump speaking (to borrow 
a fitting modem analogy) was highly distasteful. To men who admired 
moderation and compromise, Johnson's refusal to make small concessions in 
order to win larger victories for his policies seemed inexcusable stubborn-
ness. 
Johnson's character defects were all the more grievous to Rhodes and 
Dunning because these defects doomed the Presidential Reconstruction 
policy. A more capable and dignified chief executive might have salvaged 
much of Lincoln's plan of Reconstruction from the attacks of the Radicals 
and thus prevented what Rhodes and Dunning considered one of the most 
tragic eras in American history. 
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The prevailing attitude of Reconstruction historians toward the seven-
teenth president was epitomized by Rhodes: 
Johnson, by habits, manners, mind, and character, was unfit for the presidential 
office, and whatever may have been the merit of his policy, a policy devised by 
angels could never have been carried on by such an advocate. The American 
people love order and decency; they have a high regard for the presidential office, 
and they desire to see its occupant conduct himself with dignity .... Johnson 
degraded the office, and he is the only one of our presidents of whom this can be 
said.l 
This view of Johnson was dominant for about the first two decades of 
this century. But challengers arose who were to exonerate the president 
from the charges of Rhodes and Dunning and to exalt his reputation to an 
unprecedented peak by 1930. 
A major impetus to this dramatic change in historians' opinions was the 
availability of two sources of new evidence. The Andrew Johnson papers 
were acquired by the Library of Congress and made accessible to historians 
in 1905. These were of some importance in the change in attitude, but Dun-
ning used them and saw no reason to revise his view. Of more importance 
for the reputation of Johnson was the publication of the Diary of Gideon 
Wells in 1910-1911. This voluminous journal by Johnson's Secretary of the 
Navy showed Johnson in a favorable light and made a good brief on his 
behalf. 
James Schouler was the first historian to make full use of these newly 
available materials for the defense of Johnson. In fact, he added a seventh 
volume to his history of the United States explicitly to vindicate a president 
who had been mistreated by historians. Schouler's Johnson was a coura-
geous, strong, self-poised administrator. "He was stubborn in political opin-
ions where he thought himself right, defiant, ready to fight for them; yet 
those opinions were just, enlightened, and such as only a sound and inde-
pendent statesman could have formed."2 
Andrew Johnson's reputation was carried to its summit of glory by five 
publications which appeared in the half-dozen years following 1924. Like 
all sympathetic portrayals of Johnson, these five adopted the central theme 
of the president as a courageous defender of the Constitution during its 
period of greatest trial. 
The earliest of these exaltations of Johnson was a biography by Robert 
Watson Winston, a North Carolina politician and judge who retired at the 
1 James Ford Rhodes, Historical Essays, New York, 1909, p. 217. 
2 James Schouler, History of the Reconstruction Period, 1865-1877; Being Vol. Vll, 
of History of the United States of America Under the Constitution, New York, 1913, p . . 
142. 
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age of sixty to return to college to prepare himself "to interpret the New 
South to the Nation and the Nation to the New South.''3 Winston was the 
most modest of the five authors in his claims for Johnson, but he left little 
doubt that he intended to rectify earlier misconceptions. He portrayed John-
son as the soul of virtue, wholesomeness, and simplicity, a man who stub-
bornly placed country above self. The Reconstruction president's vetoes of 
civil-rights measures <lid not indicate that he was a bigot, but rather demon-
strated his respect for the Constitution. As a defender of the Constitution 
Johnson belonged in the ranks of national heroes as "a plain, rugged, two-
fisted American President, striving to do the right thing as best he could.''4 
Despite the works of Schouler and Winston, Lloyd Paul Stryker felt that 
Andrew Johnson had not received his due vindication at the judgment bar 
of history. This New York lawyer's biography of Johnson was designed to 
redress the balance and once and for all do justice to this man who was 
crucified in Abraham Lincoln's place. Stryker's biography was an elaborate 
advocate's defense of Johnson which upheld and justified the subject at all 
points in the most lavish terms, while it viciously attacked and vilified the 
enemies of Johnson. Stryker defended Johnson as being a temperate man, 
an honest man, and the great defender of the Constitution. He pointed out 
that at the time of impeachment Johnson had received numerous offers from 
former soldiers to defend him in the crisis. Therefore, Stryker contended 
that Johnson, had he chosen, could have started another civil war in which 
the forces of honor and respect for the Constitution would have been on his 
side, and the forces of dishonor and hypocrisy would have been on the 
Radicals' side. "No one can read Johnson's story without the temptation to 
regret that he did not put that bugle to his lips, and fight that war upon 
hypocrisy with bayonets. Stevens and Sumner had reveled long enough in 
their sadistic persecution orgies!" But Johnson chose the road of higher 
courage-the hemlock, if necessary.11 Thus, in highly colored, spectacular 
style did Stryker marshal the case for the defense of both Johnson and the 
South. 
If it can be said that each volume of Bancroft's History af the United 
States was a vote for Andrew Jackson, it can be asserted with equal validity 
that each page of Claude G. Bower's The Tragic Era was a vote for the 
Democratic Party of the 1920's. Bowers was a journalist whose party 
activism gained for him a career in the diplomatic service. He was the key-
s Who Was Who in America: A Companion Volume to Who's Who in America, 
Chicago, 1942-1950, II, 587. 
4 Robert W. Winston, Andrew Johnson: Plebian and Patriot, New York, 1928, p. 512. 
11 Lloyd Paul Stryker, Andrew Johnson: A Study in Courage, New York, 1929, pp. 
585-586. 
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note speaker at the Democratic National Convention in 1928, the year before 
the publication of The Tragic Era. 
Bowers was an admirer of Johnson who even defended the President's 
ill-fated "swing 'round the circle" in 1866. "Never in history had a president 
gone forth on a greater mission-to appeal for constitutional government 
and the restoration of union through conciliation and common sense; and 
never had one been so scurvily treated."6 Bowers described Johnson as a 
man of complex nature-honest, inflexible, tender, able, forceful, and tact-
less. But it was fortunate for the United States that he had two passions-
the Constitution and the Union. Bowers proclaimed Johnson one of the 
nation's greatest servants. 
The book was the story of the Reconstruction period told in an exciting, 
dramatic, and colorful fashion. The popular, readable style made it prob-
ably the most widely perused volume on Reconstruction; 7 therefore, Bowers 
has been a powerful influence on the public's attitudes toward Reconstruc-
tion and toward Andrew Johnson. Bowers indicated in his autobiography 
that the main contribution of The Tragic Era was to gain a more favorable 
interpretation of Johnson. 8 However, Bowers' influence on scholars has 
probably not been as great as on the general public since the reviews in 
scholarly journals were highly critical of the book. From the point of view 
of scholarly appreciation for The Tragic Era, Bowers had the misfortune of 
dramatizing and exaggerating the traditional interpretation just at the pre-
cise moment that that interpretation was beginning to come under attack. 
As thorough as Winston's and more readable; as interesting as Bowers' 
or Stryker's and better researched-this is the manner in which a reviewer 
described George Fort Milton's The Age of Hate: Andrew Johnson and the 
Radicals. And the reviewer was correct. Milton, a journalist and active 
Democrat, unfolds a story which never loses interest and occasionally flashes 
with brilliance of style. The book is an exhaustive defense of Johnson and 
his policy which a few words or a couple of quotations will hardly exemplify. 
Milton believed history would ultimately rescue this man of firm character 
and honorable purpose from the slander against him. And Milton showed 
a new concern-to defend Johnson against the charge of being hostile to 
Negroes. "The truth was that the President was deeply interested in the 
negro's welfare, and warmly seconded southern efforts to that end."9 
6 Claude G. Bowers, The Tragic Era: The Revolution A#er Lincoln, Cambridge, 1929, 
p. 138. 
7 Letter from Houghton, Miffiin & Co. to author, April 22, 1960. Its sales approxi-
mated 140,000 by 1960. As well as I have been able to determine, this is by far the 
largest sale figure for any book on Reconstruction. 
s Claude G. Bowers, My Life: The Menwirs of Claude Bowers, New York, 1962, pp. 
208-210. 
9 George Fort Milton, The Age of Hate: Andrew Johnson and the Radicals, New 
York, 1930, p. 286. 
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The final volume in that brace of five which brought Andrew Johnson's 
reputation to its peak by 1930 was The Critical Year: A Study of Andrew 
Johnsmi and Reconstruction by Howard K. Beale. This work is something 
of a watershed both in the interpretation of Reconstruction and in the assess-
ment of Andrew Johnson. It is the first major analysis of Reconstruction 
that develops the economic interpretation suggested just three years 
earlier in Charles and Mary Beard's Rise of American Civilization. Beale's 
study of the election of 1866 convinces him that the major issues were 
economic and that the Radicals were basically motivated by economic con-
siderations. The Radicals hammered on the emotional theme of Reconstruc-
tion in order to camouflage their real intentions-to maintain government 
in the hands of big-business, high-tariff, and sound-money interests. Re-
construction represented the method by which the new industrial class 
consolidated its control over the federal government. 
To Beale, Andrew Johnson stood as the determined, though unsuccessful, 
bulwark against control by profiteers who plundered the public wealth. 
The President represented the agrarian, anti-plutocratic, common-man point 
of view and stood out as "one of the first great conservators of our national 
resources."10 He was a courageous and sober man, a fairly able president 
whose policies were thwarted by the unfair tactics of the Radicals. 
Though Beale lauds and defends Johnson, his inferred criticisms of John-
son's political judgment laid the groundwork for a whole new barrage of 
derogations which have undermined the high position of esteem to which 
Johnson's memory had been elevated by 1930. Beale especially emphasizes 
Johnson's failure to recognize the economic issues as the true issues of the 
campaign. Had he based the congressional election campaign of 1866 on the 
real economic issues rather than on the less important issue of reconstructing 
the South, Johnson could have bound the Westerners and Southerners to 
him in a great anti-monopoly party that would have been triumphant over 
the divided Radicals. Thus, he could have inaugurated a liberal economic 
policy as well as carried out his moderate Reconstruction policy. Now, one 
would assume that an able politician would discern the basic issues and 
select the ones on which he could ride to victory; therefore, Beale, in his 
effort to vindicate Johnson, seems simultaneously ( and unintentionally) to 
relegate the Reconstruction President to a rather low order of political 
genius. 
Since Beale's transitional work, the reputation of Andrew Johnson has 
been on the decline. This is in spite of some efforts to maintain his defense 
10 Howard K. Beale, The Critical Year: A Study of Andrew Johnson and Reconstruc-
tion, New York, 1930, p. 217. 
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against an increasing avalanche of criticism. Those writers who have con-
tinued to praise the President's abilities, wisdom, and courage in recent de-
cades are those who are attached to his policy of Reconstruction and are 
trying to defend that policy against the attacks of revisionists who look with 
more favor upon the Radical congressional plan of Reconstruction. 
Two of the recent defenders of Johnson's reputation deserve no real 
notice. Their attempts are unworthy of their subject, even if their subject 
had been the worst president the United States ever had. One of them, 
George L. Tappan, wrote in 1954 a frothy little book which has no biblio-
graphy, no footnotes, no index. His material is taken almost entirely from 
Lloyd Paul Stryker, whom he quotes abundantly. The other unworthy de-
fender is Margaret Shaw Royall. Her bibliography contains sixteen titles, 
of which three are incorrect and a fourth attributed to the wrong author! 
Also, it is quite probable that the holder of Stryker's copyright could sue her 
for plagiarism. Neither Andrew Johnson nor historical writing is served by 
such as these. 
A more reasonable, though not highly effective defense of Johnson, was 
published in 1960 by Milton Lomask. In a popularly-written account of 
Johnson's presidency, Lomask portrays him as the defender of the Constitu-
tion against the attacks of the Radicals, who wanted to destroy the federal 
system and establish a sort of parliamentary government similar to England's. 
While writing in approving tones of the President's inflexible stand on con-
stitutionalism and his paternal attitude toward Negroes, Lomask does see 
grounds for criticism. Johnson was tactless and did not compromise some-
times when he could have. He did not meet the conservative Republicans 
halfway, and he failed to see the sincerity of their desire to extend civil 
rights to the Negro. Lomask's estimate of Johnson is favorable but reveals 
a glaring flaw: " ... a man of admirable character, incorruptible and patri-
otic, Andrew Johnson was one of the best political philosophers and one of 
the poorest politicians ever to sit in the White House."11 
While defenders of Andrew Johnson have been in evidence in the last 
few decades, they have been unequal to the task of maintaining his repu-
tation against the gathering crescendo of criticism by recent historians of 
Reconstruction. 
The most extensive and damaging critique is Eric McKitrick's Andrew 
Johnson and Reconstruction, published in 1960. McKitrick's chief theme is 
to demonstrate how Johnson "threw away his own power both as President 
and as party leader, how he assisted materially, in spite of himself, in block-
ing the reconciliation of North and South, and what his behavior did toward 
11 Milton Lomask, Andrew Johnson: President on Trial, New York, 1960, p. 345. 
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disrupting the political life of an entire nation .... "12 Shortly after the war 
Johnson's position was very strong. Almost all the Republican newspapers 
supported him and the Radicals were not yet a solid phalanx against him. 
He should have considered himself an agent of the victorious element in 
dealing with the defeated, but he refused to impose terms. And when the 
Congress reconvened he constantly tried to thwart its attempts to establish 
reasonable terms of peaceful settlement. Gradually, the whole Republican 
party did begin to move toward the more extreme aims of Negro suffrage, 
exclusion of Southern states, and anti-Johnson sentiment. But the men 
called Radicals did not cause this movement, in McKitrick's judgment. "If 
there were to be a real prime mover, a 'casual agent; such a role would have 
to be played by the one man-Andrew Johnson-whose behavior was criti-
cal in anything and everything the party did."13 By his vetoes and his at-
tacks, Johnson alienated more and more of his former supporters and forced 
the Congress toward a more radical position. 
But thus far McKitrick has only damned Johnson for some of the weak-
nesses that even his best friends recognized. His criticism goes deeper; it 
penetrates to that central virtue upon which his defenders based his case-
his constitutional position. McKitrick rejects the idea that Johnson's posi-
tion on the Constitution was the only valid, sound, and honest stand while 
others' positions were dishonest and irrelevant covers for base motives. 
"Andrew Johnson was by no means the only man who cared immensely 
about the Constitution."14 Of course, political arrangements underwent a 
change in such a tumultous time as the emergence from Civil War, but the 
Constitution was still a real check on men's minds. So the granite figure of 
Johnson heroically maintaining the Constitution while all others would 
trample upon it begins to crumble. 
David Donald, too, chips away at this constitutionalist image. He denies 
that Johnson's Reconstruction policies can be explained in terms of uncom-
promising attachment to the letter of the Constitution. No doubt the presi-
dent, like most Americans, believed in the Constitution, but he was not an 
inflexible constitutionalist. For example, as military governor of Tennessee 
he imposed an oath which disqualified political enemies from voting and 
as President he appointed provisional governors for Southern states and gave 
instructions for the creation of new governments, all without constitutional 
authority. Donald explains Johnson's behavior on the basis of political con-
siderations. And in his latest book, The Politics of Reconstruction, he gives 
12 Eric L. McKitrick, Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction, Chicago, 1960, p. 14. 
1s Ibid., p. 66. 
14 Ibid., p . 95. 
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Johnson credit for proving himself "a virtuoso of politics."111 This shows an 
interesting change in Donald's assessment of the Reconstruction president; 
in 1956 Donald scored him for his "political ineptitude.''16 
Another blow to the view of Johnson as the pure constitutionalist fighting 
for principle is dealt by John and LaWanda Cox in Politics, Principle, and 
Pre;udice, 1865-1866 ( 1963). It has been customary to accuse the Radicals 
of acting for partisan political reasons while assuming that Johnson stood on 
sound, seIHess, constitutional grounds. The Coxes document the partisan 
political ambitions and maneuvers of the Radicals' opponents. They deny 
that Johnson was primarily motivated by an inflexible adherence to the 
Constitution and to principle. He was influenced at least as much by poli-
tical ambition and racial prejudice. He sought to develop a third party 
which would perpetuate his own power. He largely caused the impasse 
between himself and Congress by refusing to guarantee basic rights of citi-
zenship to the Negro. 
Here we encounter what appears to be the basic factor in the decline of 
Andrew Johnson's reputation among recent historians-his position con-
cerning rights for Negroes. Reconstruction historiography has been domi-
nated for the last two decades by historians who favor a position of equality 
for the Negro in American society. They have taken a new look at the 
relative values of the policies of Johnson and the Radicals. They have found 
that the Radical policies were designed to do for the Negro then what the 
American society is trying to do for him now, and have decided that those 
policies could not have been all wrong. They have found that Johnson's pro-
gram tended to inhibit the advance of the Negro and consequently have 
decided that that program could not have been all right. 
As early as 1935 the Negro historian and civil-rights activist, W. E. B. 
DuBois, was saying that the key to Johnson's career was his inability to over-
come his prejudices and include Negroes in his concept of democracy.17 
Most of the biographers of Thaddeus Stevens have tended to portray Stevens 
as the sincere champion of the Negro while Andrew Johnson was an un-
fortunate or evil obstacle.18 In a recent appreciative study of the role of 
111 David H. Donald, The Politics of Recimstruction, 1863-1867, Baton Rouge, 1965, 
p. 23. 
16 David H. Donald, "Why They Impeached Andrew Johnson," American Heritage, 
VLII (December, 1956), 103. 
17 W. E . Burghardt DuBois, Black Reconstruction: An Essay toward a History of the 
Part Which Black Folk Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 
1860-1880, New York, 1935, pp. 241-242, 332. 
Is Fawn M. Bodie, Thaddeus Stevens: Scourge of the South, New York, 1959; Ralph 
Korngold, Thaddeus Stevens: A Being Darkly Wise and Rudely Great, New York, 1955; 
Alphonse B. Miller, Thaddeus Stevens, New York, 1939; Thomas Frederick Woodley, 
Great Leveler: The Life of Thaddeus Stevens, New York, 1937. 
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abolitionists during the Civil War and Reconstruction period, James M. Mc-
Pherson portrays Johnson as a racist who brought disaster upon himself by 
driving moderates into alliance with the Radicals.19 W. R. Brock, a Cam-
bridge University historian, generally concurs in this evaluation in his fresh 
analysis of the political and constitutional problems of the immediate post-
war period. 20 
Perhaps the nearest approximation to a summary of the interpretation 
of Andrew Johnson now prevalent is _found in Kenneth M. Stampp's new 
synthesis: The Era of Reconstruction, 1865-1877 (1965). Stampp sees John-
son as the last of the J acksonians, living in a static world, practicing the poli-
tics of nostalgia. At the end of the war Johnson set out to create agrarian 
democracies in the Southern states, but the planter politicians defeated his 
purpose, maintained their dominance, and won his acceptance of their re-
organized state governments. Johnson's violent, uncompromising behavior 
played a large role in forcing the moderate Republicans to join with the 
Radicals and assume control of the Reconstruction process. Furthermore, 
Johnson was unwilling to include the Negro in his democratic creed. It 
has been argued that race relations would have been better in subsequent 
years had it not been for the Radicals' program; however, Stampp says: 
"The truth is that, before the radical program began, the Johnson govern-
ments themselves had introduced the whole pattern of disenfranchisement, 
discrimination, and segregation into the postwar South. And there, quite 
possibly, matters might still stand, had Andrew Johnson had his way."21 
This view of Johnson is fully as unfavorable to him as the Rhodes-Dun-
ning interpretation. So, the reputation of Andrew Johnson has now made 
the full swing 'round the circle and returned to its early twentieth century 
nadir. Such is the fate of presidents; such are the ways of historians. 
19 James M. McPherson, The Struggle for Equality: Abolitionists and the Negro in the 
Civil War and Recorutruction, Princeton, 1964. 
20 W.R. Brock, An American Crisis: Congress and Reconstruction, 1865-1867, London, 
1963. 
21 Kenneth M. Stampp, The Era of Reconstruction, 1865-1877, New York, 1965, p. 82. 
THE MATURE RELIGIOUS THOUGHT OF JOHN ADAMS 
ROBERT B. EVERETT 
Until recently the personality and thought of John Adams has been 
under something of a cloud. He has been traditionally placed in the great 
eighteenth-century conservative triad with Alexander Hamilton and John 
Marshall. His views of the functions of government and of the natural aristo-
cracy he felt should run it often have been depicted as the counterpoint to 
Jeffersonian liberalism. Whether Adams' political views deserve their reputa-
tion is not at issue here; rather, it is with another, less well-known facet of 
his thought-his religious faith-that this study is concerned. In this area, 
it can be said with some degree of certainty that Adams was no conserva-
tive; in fact, he was among the leading freethinkers of his generation. 
Adams' religious background was a curious blend of New-World Puritan-
ism and Old-World Enlightenment. His family had come to Massachusetts 
as part of the great migration of the 1640's which had populated the Bay 
Colony with Englishmen of strong Puritan persuasions. Although the Adams 
family produced no clergymen, anyone who lived in the colony of Cotton 
Mather and Jonathan Edwards could not have escaped the all-pervasive 
Puritanism of the dominant sect. Yet, by the time young John Adams began 
his education, New England Puritanism had undergone some significant 
changes. The European Enlightenment and all that it meant made itself 
felt in the religious life of New England in the Great Awakening. It was 
in the backwash of the Great Awakening that Adams pursued his A.B. de-
gree at Harvard, a school completely captured by the new thought. Har-
vard in the 1750's was no place for a young man who disliked theological 
disputation, and Adams, as he later wrote, reveled in it.1 
Even though he generally approved of controversy, the acrimony as-
sociated with theological debates at Harvard proved too much for Adams 
and he turned from a possible career in the ministry to the practice of law. 
The spirit "of intolerance," he wrote, "convinced me I should be forever un-
fit for the profession of divinity . . . ."2 But in spite of his rejection of the 
ministry, Adams carried away from Harvard a deep interest in theology and 
philosophy. It was there that he was introduced to Voltaire, John Locke, and 
Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke. Bolingbroke especially made a deep 
impression on young Adams. It was later said that, during a short teaching 
1 John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, September 14, 1813, in The Adams-Jefferson 
Letters, The Complete Correspondence Between Thomas Jefferson and Abigail anil John 
Adams, edited by Lester J. Cappon, Chapel Hill, 1959, II, 374; hereafter Adams will be 
referred to as JA, Jefferson as TJ, and this work as Letters. 
2 IA-Skelton Jones, March 11, 1809, in The Works of John Adams, edited by Charles 
F. Adams, Boston, 1850-1856, IX, 611; hereafter cited as Works. 
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career at Worchester ( 1754-1755), he memorized all of the English deist's 
writings.3 And although, in later years, he rejected much of the embittered 
Bolingbroke's thought, it was Bolingbroke's censure of organized Christian-
ity that set the tone for Adams' more mature religious views. 
Bolingbroke, Locke, and Voltaire did not, however, make up the sum of 
Adams' theological reading. In 1813, he wrote Thomas Jefferson that he had 
read books Jefferson had never heard of or seen. He was, by his own word, 
conversant with all the changing currents of thought in the European as well 
as the American colleges. These controversies, he wrote, were "the marbles 
and nine pins of old age: I will not say the beads and prayer books."4 In 
his later years, then, Adams was well acquainted with the current literature 
of theological controversy, perhaps even better prepared to discuss trends 
and changes than his favorite correspondent, Jefferson. At one time, Adams 
even chided Jefferson for reading too exclusively in the classics of the ancient 
world, but he tempered his criticism with the observation that Jefferson 
may have learned more from the ancients than he could have from Joseph 
Priestly or Lord Boling broke. 5 
Although Adams was intensely interested in religion throughout his life, 
he never saw fit to systematize his thought. His responses to the ultimate 
questions of life and nature tended to be ad hoc, rather than a formal state-
ment of belief. It is, thus, rather difficult to say what Adams believed on 
every one of the great theological questions of his day. Even so, an attempt 
to do what Adams himself never did-to formalize his thought-is a valid 
approach to "getting at" his religious framework. What follows is a dis-
cussion of several of the more pertinent aspects of eighteenth-century the-
ological controversy and how Adams dealt with them. If at times Adams 
seems confusing or contradictory, it must be remembered that he made no 
attempt at consistency and that his viewpoints were often expressed in con-
texts other than theological. 
With the publication of the works of Newton, Kepler, and Galileo, one 
of the central concerns of the eighteenth century became the nature of the 
universe itself. Like most well-educated men of his century, John Adams 
was aware of the changing views men held of the world and their place in 
it. He knew that a man's stance toward the basic problem of the nature of 
the universe determined in large measure his views on other matters as well. 
And for Adams and most of his philosophic contemporaries the world was 
no longer viewed as a vale of tears, a short and unhappy sojourn for the 
3 JA-TJ, Works, X, 82. 
4 JA-TJ, July 18, 1813, Letters, II, 362. 
5 Jbid. 
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saints on their way to the Heavenly City. Rather, it was a benevolent uni-
verse made for man's use and enjoyment. Adams felt it the height of pre-
sumption to say anything more about the basic essence of the universe, for 
the universe presented so many varied faces to man that definitive state-
ments were impossible. For Adams the cosmic reality was "a mixture of 
the Sublime and the beautiful, the base and the contemptible, the whimsical 
and ridiculous .... It is a riddle and an Enigma."6 One of the major errors 
of eighteenth-century Christian theologians, he felt, was their insistence on 
basing their theologies on their cosmologies. It was "not only vain," he 
wrote, "but wicked."7 Adams, then, envisioned the universe as a great and 
deep mystery only partially revealed to man. What man's reason, which he 
saw as God's revelatory gift to humanity, had shown was an essentially good, 
almost paternalistic, cosmos fully under the control of a benevolently dis-
interested God. There was little new or startingly original in this view; 
it was widely accepted by deists and "natural theists" throughout the eigh-
teenth century.8 It was, however, very important to Adams' whole religious 
framework and set him squarely in conflict with the Calvinistic view of the 
universe and the God who ruled it. 
In the Massachusetts of Adams' boyhood, Calvinism was more than a re-
ligious system, it was a way of life. Everyone in Adams' family was a con-
vinced Calvinist, and his father had even dared to hope that his son would 
go into the ministry. Yet, it was against all that he had learned "at his 
mother's knee" that he most rebelled. He claimed himself to be an "un-
natural son" of three generations of Calvin's followers. It was Calvin's sys-
tem, not Calvinists, that so repelled Adams. He found the Geneva the-
ologian's view of God abhorrent and virtually un-Christian. Adams' own 
view of God was of a benevolent and providential Being whose essence was 
love and paternalism. That such a God could save only a handful from the 
world's billions and condemn the rest to eternal perdition, as the Calvinists 
insisted, was an absurd notion. "Howl, Snarl, bite, Ye Calvinistic! Ye Ath-
anasian Divines, if you will," he exclaimed in a letter to Jefferson. "Ye will 
say I am no Christian: I say ye are no Christians: and there the account is 
Balanced."1° Calvinistic explanations of the harsh doctrine of election did 
not satisfy Adams either. That a God, declared by all to be truth, goodness, 
and wisdom, could condemn men to misery simply to celebrate His glory was 
6 JA-TJ, September l5, 1813, Letters, II, 376. 
7 JA-TJ, September 14, 1813, Letters, II, 375. 
s Adams was probably more indebted for his cosmological views to the English 
Unitarian, Joseph B. Priestley, than to any other writer of the period. 
9 ]A-Samuel Miller, July 8, 1820, Works, X, 389-390. 
10 JA-TJ, September 14, 1813, Letters, II, 374. 
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incredible. "For his own Glory? Wretch!" Adams cried out, "does he want 
promotion? Is he vain?"11 
On the important question of the essential nature of man Adams also 
parted company with the Calvinists. The Enlightment view of man as es-
sentially good, but corrupted by some agency or condition over which he 
had no control was the view Adams himself adhered to most closely. He, 
of course, rejected the doctrines of original sin and total depravity. Each 
man possessed some intrinsic potential for good. Even the Popes, Jesuits, 
and Inquisitors, he once said, "had some conscience and some religion."12 
For it was in the conscience of man that his potential goodness lay. Here 
one can clearly see the influence of the Enlightment tradition and, especial-
ly, of Condorcet. And though it is not always clear from his writings, Adams 
did believe in a sort of ultimate perfectability of man. To Jefferson he wrote: 
"Perfectability, I shall not deny: for a greater Character than Priestly or 
Godwin has said, 'Be ye perfect.' "13 
Though there may be some confusion over other points in Adams' re-
ligious thought, there can be little doubt that he denied the orthodox doc-
trine of the Trinity. He celebrated the passage of an English bill to make 
Unitarians recognized Dissenters and, in later life, he became one of the 
first Unitarians in Quincy, Massachusetts. To Adams the human faculty of 
reason was God's highest revelation of Himself to man and what reason 
declared "can never be disputed or doubted."111 Since the doctrine of the 
Trinity offended reason, it could be summarily dismissed as incredible. To 
Jefferson, Adams once confided that had he been on Mt. Sinai with Moses 
and witnessed the thunder and lightning, he might not have had the courage 
to deny such a teaching as the Trinity, but he "could not have believed it."16 
His anti-Trinitarian view should not be taken, however, as evidence of his 
deism. While there were elements of deism running throughout his thought, 
Adams fits more easily into the pattern of American Unitarianism, seen best, 
perhaps, in William Ellery Channing. 
John Adams' view of the role of the Jewish people in history is also indi-
cative of his liberal and tolerant attitude toward alien systems of thought. 
He felt the process of human and divine history had placed the Jewish 
people in a particularly high position. It was their role to propagate to all 
mankind the intelligent and highly sophisticated notion of one wise, omni-
11 JA-TJ, September 14, 1813, Letters, II, 373-374. 
12 JA-TJ, April 19, 1817, Letters, II, 509. 
13 JA-TJ, June 28, 1813, Letters, II, 338. 
14 JA-TJ, September 14, 1813, Letters, II, 373. 
111 Ibid. 
16 Jbid. 
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potent God who was the Author of the universe. Had he believed that there 
was no God, he said, and that irrational fate had ordered all that was in the 
universe, "then I should still believe that fate had ordained the Jews to be 
the most essential instrument for civilizing nations.''17 
Adams also held the person and work of Jesus of Nazareth in high rever-
ence. Though he felt that the mission of Jesus had been distorted by cen-
turies of priestcraft, he still maintained that Jesus was unique in history. 
In Jesus, Adams saw benevolence personified, the same sort of benevolence 
that he felt characterized the universe, and in that sense Jesus was divine.18 
As a Unitarian, Adams did not, of course, accept the divinity of Jesus in any 
sense which might imply a special sort of divinity apart from that available 
to all men. Jesus was not the Christ in the traditional, orthodox usage of 
that term; rather, He was the culmination of Jewish development, a figure 
in history who showed mankind true religion based on "reason, equity and 
love.''19 In 1813 Jefferson sent Adams a copy of his "Syllabus of an Estimate 
of the Merit of the Doctrines of Jesus, Compared with Those of Others," 
which Adams went over very carefully and evidently approvingly.20 In this 
work Jefferson displayed his relativism by setting Jesus alongside other 
famous thinkers of antiquity such as Socrates, Cicero and Aristotle. In it 
Jefferson advocated going "back to the very words of Jesus" instead of rely-
ing on what the Church taught concerning Him. In his Shorter Bible J effer-
son had done essentially what he advocated in the "Syllabus," that is, he had 
stricken from the Bible itself all that did not meet the dictates of reason. 
Wrote Adams, "I admire your Employment, in selecting the philosophy and 
Divinity of Jesus and seperating [sic] it from all intermixtures. If I had eyes 
and nerves, I would go through both Testaments and mark all that I under-
stand."21 
The power of God to influence history, or the doctrine of providence, 
was always an attractive aspect of Calvin's thought for John Adams. Even 
though he was never very specific about his belief in the doctrine of provi-
dence, Adams spoke late in life of the "providence of God" that had led 
him through life with more than the usual amount of felicity and happiness. 
Given the basic benevolence of the universe and the God who controlled it, 
Adams held to the over-arching protection of God in the same sense as the 
deist who believed that God guided the universe as a great watchmaker 
oversees a fine watch. 22 
17 JA-F.A. Van DerKemp, February 16, 1809, Works, IX, 609-610. 
18 JA-F.A. Van DerKemp, December 27, 1816, Works, X, 234. 
l9 Jbid. 
20 Letters, II, 344. 
21 JA-TJ, November 14, 1813, Letters, II, 396-397. 
22 }A-Benjamin Rush, April 12, 1809, Works, IX, 619. 
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In keeping with his Puritan background Adams often attended church 
services. He left only scanty references to his views on church attendance, 
but from his intense interest in theology one can surmise that he rather en-
joyed the intellectual give-and-take of a New England sermon. Here and 
there in his writings, however, the perceptive reader can detect a note of 
disdain for public worship. Quoting Hesiod's "Honour the Gods established 
by law," Adams wrote Jefferson that he had suffered for lack of due observ-
ance of that precept. He spoke of "martyrdom" for not observing public 
mores more closely; presumably, he meant political martyrdom.23 This is 
not to imply that Adams treated Christianity cavalierly. Indeed, he thought 
that Christianity was a force for good in the world, and, in spite of all its 
faults, Christianity was no passing phase in human history. No society with-
out the aid of revelation could have invented such a high form of religion, 
and Adams saw great social utility in public worship, especially for the 
untutored masses. But as for his own affiliation with a Christian sect, he 
wrote: "Ask me not, then, whether I am a Catholic or Protestant, Calvinist 
or Arminian. As far as they are Christians, I wish to be a fellow-disciple with 
th "24 em. 
Adams' ethics can be briefly summed up in the phrase, "be just and 
good." It was his way of rendering the golden rule without too obvious a 
reliance upon the precept of Jesus, or perhaps simply to avoid the triteness 
of a phrase so often used that it had lost much of its meaning. Personal be-
havior, in Adams' view, should be based on a simple and universal ethic, 
such as the one above. In this he was not far from the traditional formula-
tions of Christianity. 25 Adams believed that mankind would be judged both 
by history and by God, and he believed further in a future state of rewards 
and punishments based on the life one had lived on earth. He did not, how-
ever, concede that a good God would allow punishment to go on indefinite-
ly. 26 Thus, Adams in this regard held to the orthodox view that a good life 
on earth would lead to a better existence in the hereafter, but he differed 
with the Calvinists once again when he insisted that punishment into etern-
ity was inconsistent with the concept of a fatherly God. 
One of the burning questions of the early national period in American 
history was the relationship between church and state. Adams stood ada-
mantly against any official link between these two aspects of society. In his 
rather lengthy correspondence with John Taylor of Caroline, Adams made 
his stand abundantly clear, stating that wherever throne and altar were 
23 JA-TJ, December 3, 1813, Letters, II, 402-403. 
24 JA-Benjamin Rush, January 21, 1810, Works, IX, 627. 
25 JA-TJ, December 12, 1816, Works, X, 232. 
26 JA-F.A. Van DerKemp, July 13, 1815, Works, X, 232. 
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united, as in Europe, learning and freedom were lost.27 Institutionalized 
Christianity, Adams believed, was not above using the law to perpetuate 
itself long past the time of its social usefulness. He blamed Roman Catho-
licism most especially for this type of behavior, but he did not exempt 
Protestantism from such criticism. Though he cannot be classed as anti-
clerical, Adams did have a deeply ingrained suspicion of the power of the 
clergy. He felt that because the clergy had controlled education through-
out most of the history of the Western world, it was largely responsible for 
the growth of superstition and corruption of religion. 28 In short, Adams was 
not anti-clerical, but he did blame the clergy for a great deal of mischief 
through narrow-mindedness and their desire to preserve their institutional 
identity and privilege. 
Adams was also clear on the question of laws to enforce religious belief. 
He opposed them as strenuously as his advancing age would allow. In the 
year before his death, he wrote Jefferson decrying the attempts of some of 
the states to punish those who in any manner criticized the Bible. "Books 
that cannot bear examination," he wrote, "certainly ought not to be estab-
lished as divine inspiration by penal laws."29 Tightly centralized churches 
tended to try to protect their institutionalism through influencing secular 
legislation in their favor, thereby threatening freedom. Although aware 
of the activities of Puritanism in this regard, he most feared the Roman 
Catholic Church. Roman Catholicism, he declared, could not coexist with 
freedom in "any nation or Country .... "80 
If there were a strong link between church and state in America, Adams 
foresaw the day when the vying sects would bring social chaos by trying to 
enforce their forms of worship or their doctrinal positions. His solution to 
such a state of affairs was toleration, an idea neither ancient nor widespread 
in the early nineteenth century. Toleration was the result of Adams' reflec-
tion on the ideas of the Enlightenment and his awareness of the long, acri-
monious and sometimes bloody religious quarrels America had experienced in 
her colonial period. Intolerance, he felt, was one of society's most insidious 
enemies. If intolerance remained unchecked, it could wreak havoc in the 
social fiber of America and upset the ideals upon which her Revolution was 
based, a revolution which Adams helped to achieve. It can, therefore, be 
said with some degree of certainty that Adams was a firm adherent to the 
27 Norman Cousins, ed., 'In God We Trust' The Religious Beliefs and Ideas of the 
American Founding Fathers, New York, 1958, pp. 105, 111. 
28 JA-TJ, December 3, 1813, Letters, II, 404-405; JA-F.A. Van DerKemp, Decem-
ber 27, 1816, Works, X, 235. 
29 JA-TJ January 23, 1825, Letters, II, 608. 
so JA-TJ, February 3, 1821, Letters, II, 571. 
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separation of church and state and to Jefferson's principle that error may 
exist where reason is also free to combat it. 
The question of Adams' place in the history of ideas is perplexing. 
Whereas Adams was clearly not orthodox in his religious beliefs, he did not, 
however, consider himself as part of that intellectual movement known to-
day as the Enlightenment. As has been shown, there is a great deal of evi-
dence to indicate that Adams was correct in not placing himself in that 
movement, but there is still the disturbing question whether in a broader 
context Adams might not be considered with Jefferson and Franklin as an 
American "son of the Enlightenment." Actually, he had some very caustic 
things to say about the high priests of the European Age of Reason. To 
Jefferson he remarked that the phflosophes-Voltaire, Buffon, Rousseau, 
Frederick, Catherine and others-could have rendered mankind a great 
service if they had possessed a measure of common sense, "but they were 
all totally destitute of it."31 Reviling the philosophes as atheists who toyed 
with the terms "liberty" and "spirit," Adams felt they had done the world 
and themselves an injustice by replacing God with Fate and Spirit with 
Matter. Such changes were not only unwise for society, he felt, but also bad 
philosophy. Late in life, Adams even expressed disillusionment with the 
very watchword of the Enlightenment: progress.32 Numerous references 
throughout his correspondence indicate the extent of the influence of Joseph 
Priestley upon his thought, but he also differed strongly with the English 
Unitarian on several of his most seminal points.33 Thus, the more deeply 
one delves into the thought of John Adams the more difficult it becomes to 
categorize him neatly into one of the prevailing religious or philosophic 
schools. 
Adams was an intense individualist in all matters, and religion was no 
exception. He was influenced by all the thought of the eighteenth century, 
but he was not overwhelmed by it. From the philosophes, for example, he 
took what he considered valuable and left what he saw as chaff or fuzzy 
thinking. With Voltaire and others he agreed that man could, under proper 
conditions of social and political freedom, attain a more reasonable re-
ligious faith without the need for elaborate props from established religion, 
but he did not agree with the philosophes' unbridled attacks on the sub-
stance of Christianity as well as its forms. He rightly held that this only 
replaced religious intolerance with intolerance of another variety, and it was 
this sort of secular intolerance that so frightened him as he watched the 
events of the French Revolution unfold. Adams, then, cannot be easily 
81 JA-TJ, March 2, 1816, Letters, II, 464-465. 
32 JA-TJ, July 15, 1813, Letters, II, 358. 
83 JA-TJ, July 22, 1813, Letters, II, 363. 
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placed in the stream of eighteenth-century thought, religious or otherwise. 
He evidently felt no compulsions for consistency; therefore, his religious 
views must be gleaned from often contradictory, even rhapsodic, statements 
contained in informal letters to close friends. To Thomas Jefferson, Ben-
jamin Rush, F. A. Van DerKemp, and a few others, his statements on this 
subject were candid and frank; to others, less well known to him, he was 
often guarded and evasive. Even so, one is able to say that certain of his 
views are fairly well established. 
In summary, Adams believed in the essential goodness of the creation. 
He considered the universe benevolent and man's place in it sanguine. He 
firmly rejected the Calvinistic view of a jealous God who punished humans 
for his own "glory;" instead, God was a fatherly spirit who authored the 
Universe, set the world spinning through the orderly workings of natural 
law, and gently moves it toward a final perfection. The idea that God 
could share his essence with another "person" was, in Adams' view, an 
absurd notion; thus, the concept of the Trinity offended his reason. He 
held Jesus in a special reverence, but was unwilling to ascribe to him any 
special qualities of godliness unavailable to other men. He believed in a 
loose doctrine of providence, but he rejected the idea that God intervened 
directly in the affairs of ordinary men. He did, however, concede that God 
directed the destinies of whole races such as the Jews. While he advocated 
regular church worship as beneficial to the moral sense, he disliked elaborate 
ritual. To a man who spent much of his life in public service, the question 
of ethics and administration of justice were very important. Adams' ethics 
can be summed up in the phrase "be just and good" to all with whom one 
comes in contact in political and private life. He advocated the separation 
of church and state, though he harbored no full-blown anti-clericalism. His 
solution to internecine religious squabbles was toleration, a doctrine rather 
advanced for his day. Basically, Adams strove for a religion based on a 
common sense sort of reasonableness. He had no elaborate concept of Rea-
son such as those of the French philosophes, but he did maintain that re-
ligion must change and evolve toward that perfection about which religion-
ists so often spoke. In summary, Adams was not a deist, though he used 
deistical terms and formulae; he was not an orthodox Christian, though he 
was unwilling to reject that tradition out of hand. He was simply John 
Adams, a man who thought independently and often. 
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upon reaching the age of sixty-five, any member upon notifying the Secre-
tary-Treasurer in writing, may be elected an emeritus member by the Execu-
tive Committee. Emeritus members have all the rights and privileges of 
membership without being required to pay the annual dues. 
Members in student status shall pay annual dues of only $2.00. 
IV 
The officers shall be a president, a vice-president, and a secretary and 
treasurer who shall be elected by ballot at each regular annual meeting. A 
list of nominations shall be presented by the executive committee, but nomi-
nations from the floor may be made. The officers shall have the duties and 
perform the functions customarily attached to their respective offices with 
such others as may from time to time be prescribed. 
V 
There shall be an executive committee made up of the officers and of 
three other members elected by ballot for a terms of three years; at the first 
election, however, one shall be elected for two years. Vacancies shall be 
filled by election in the same manner at the annual meeting following their 
occurrence. Until such time they shall be filled by appointment by the 
president. The duties of the executive committee shall be to fix the date 
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and place of the annual meeting, to attend to the publication of the pro-
ceedings of the Association, to prepare a program for the annual meeting, 
to prepare a list of nominations for the officers of the Association as provided 
in Article IV, and such other duties as may be from time to time assigned 
to them by the Association. There shall be such other committees as the 
president may appoint. or be instructed to appoint, by resolution of the 
Association. 
VI 
There shall be an annual meeting of the Association at the time and 
place appointed by the executive committee. 
VII 
A. The Association shall publish annually its proceedings to be known 
as The Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association. It shall 
contain the minutes of the annual meeting together with such papers and 
documents selected by the executive committee as may be published without 
incurring a deficit. Each fifth year, beginning in 1956, the Proceedings shall 
include a copy of the constitution and by-laws of the Association. 
B. All papers read at the annual meeting shall become the property of 
the Association except as otherwise may be provided by the executive 
committee. 
C. The executive committee shall annually elect an editor of the Pro-
ceedings. He shall have authority to appoint an associate editor and shall 
be a member of the executive committee, but without vote. 
VIII 
This constitution may be amended by a two-thirds vote of the members 
present at the annual business meeting. 
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